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I. Introduction 
 
Eavesdropping on private conversations has occurred since 
time immemorial. At common law this practice was considered 
a nuisance punishable as a crime.1 Along with the development 
of electricity and the telegraph, the secret interception of 
private electronic messages began.2 States recognized early on 
the danger to individual privacy accompanying the ability to 
surreptitiously listen to private telegraph and telephone 
messages. As early as the turn of the Twentieth Century, 
states such as Illinois and California prohibited the use of 
wiretaps.3 In addition to these privacy concerns, however, law-
enforcement agencies were also quick to recognize the 
advantages of being able to covertly listen to a private 
conversation. During the era of Prohibition, for example, 
 
  * Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP; J.D., summa cum laude, Seton 
Hall University School of Law; B.S., Union College. 
1. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169. Although at 
common law a nuisance was generally punishable as a criminal offense, today 
it is generally considered a tort. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 
484, 495 (N.J. 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b 
(1979)). 
2. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1967) (recounting 
the early history of eavesdropping laws). 
3. See id. at 46. 
1
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“wiretaps were the principal source of information relied upon 
by the police as the basis for prosecutions.”4 The use of 
wiretaps remains prevalent today. It continues to be one of the 
most important law enforcement tools available and one of the 
most persuasive pieces of evidence that can be presented to a 
jury. Indeed, as the world has become more “connected” with 
emerging technology, the prevalence of wiretap use in criminal 
investigations has increased. The reported number of 
authorized wiretap applications has grown by a total of sixty-
one percent from 2001 through 2011.5 
The expanded use of wiretaps presents troubling questions 
for courts and litigants. Although wiretaps are generally 
subject to challenges under the Fourth Amendment, the 
modern use of wiretaps has been defined largely by statute. 
Following several developments in the area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act 
of 1968, which was passed as Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III” or “Title III of 
the Crime Control Act”).6 The purpose of Title III was to 
balance properly the competing law enforcement and privacy 
interests inherent in the government’s covert interception of 
personal conversations.7 In order to preserve individual 
privacy, Congress enacted several statutory protections meant 
 
4. Id. 
5. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS 
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 10 (June 2012), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2011/2011WireT
ap.pdf [hereinafter 2011 WIRETAP REPORT]. This, however, may also be due in 
part to federal and state officials’ increased awareness of reporting 
requirements. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, APPLICATIONS FOR 
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 7 (June 2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2010/2010WireT
apReport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 WIRETAP REPORT] (noting that the thirty-four 
percent increase in reported wiretaps between 2009 and 2010 was “due, at 
least in part, to enhanced [Administrative Office of the United States Courts’] 
efforts to ensure that federal and state authorities were aware of their 
reporting responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 2519”). 
6. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, Pub. 
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, §§ 801-802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012)). 
7. See id.§ 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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to avoid government investigators resorting to wiretap use as a 
matter of course. Two of the most important requirements 
mandate that a wiretap may be used only where the 
government is investigating a specific enumerated offense 
found in Title III and that the government may use a wiretap 
only where it is “necessary” to advance a criminal 
investigation.8 As several recent white-collar prosecutions 
indicate, both of these requirements have been weakened by 
the courts.9 In turn, this development threatens the balance of 
interests that Congress sought to achieve in enacting Title 
III.10 
Starting in the late 1960s, Congress directed that wiretaps 
could be authorized for use only where government officials are 
investigating certain enumerated offenses specifically listed in 
Title III.11 Most pervasively, wiretaps have been permitted for 
use by government officials in investigating organized drug-
trafficking schemes. For example, in 2011, narcotics 
investigations accounted for over eighty-five percent of all 
court-authorized electronic intercepts.12 Recently, however, 
federal authorities have been able to obtain convictions for 
white-collar crimes beyond those enumerated in Title III based, 
in part, on the use of wiretap evidence.13 Over the past several 
years in the Southern District of New York, more than 65 
people have been convicted of insider trading either through 
plea agreement or jury verdict.14 Of the eight cases to go to 
 
8. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1., III.B.3. 
9. See id. 
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
11. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 216-17 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012)). 
12. 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 tbl.3 (a total of 2,334 out 
of 2,732 wiretaps warrants were granted to investigate narcotics offenses). 
13. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Winning Record of Prosecutors of 
Insider Trading, N.Y TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 21, 2012, 11:49 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/the-winning-record-of-prosecutors-of-
insider-trading/ (discussing recent cases). 
14. Walter Pavlo, Doug Whitman Guilty of Insider Trading, FORBES, 
(Aug. 20, 2012, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2012/08/20/doug-whitman-guilty-of-
insider-trading/. 
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trial, the government has a perfect conviction rate.15 In the 
most high-profile of these cases, the prosecution of Raj 
Rajaratnam, founder of the Galleon Group hedge fund, federal 
prosecutors relied heavily on the use of wiretaps.16 The 
Galleon-related cases mark “the first time that court-
authorized wiretaps have been used to target significant 
insider trading on Wall Street.”17 This development sent shock-
waves through the world of finance; the change in investigative 
technique signaled by these cases has alternatively been 
described as “seismic,”18 “dramatic,”19 and a “landmark.”20 
Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, summed up the anxiety felt on Wall 
Street when announcing the arrest of several insider-trading 
defendants: “Today, tomorrow, next week, the week after, 
privileged Wall Street insiders who are considering breaking 
the law will have to ask themselves one important question: Is 
law enforcement listening?”21 
In addition to the expanded use of wiretaps during the 
investigation of crimes not specifically enumerated under Title 
III, courts have also been weakening other statutory 
 
15. Henning, supra note 13. 
16. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
17. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Prepared 
Remarks for U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara: U.S. v. Raj Rajaratnam, et al.; 
U.S. v. Dainielle [sic] Chiesi, et al., Hedge Fund Insider Trading Takedown 2 
(Oct. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/hedgefund/hedgefundinsidertradingremarks1
01609.pdf. 
18. See Stephen A. Miller, Will There be a ‘CSI Effect’ for Wiretapping?, 
L. TECH. NEWS (ONLINE) (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120249477
3565&Will_There_Be_a_CSI_Effect_for_Wiretapping&slreturn=20120722144
320. 
19. See White Collar Crime, Blue Collar Tactics: A Defense Lawyer’s 
Perspective, BAKER BOTTS, 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications/detail.aspx?id=037e2b4e-
0948-44d4-8159-129d0e61c018 (last visited July 13, 2013). 
20. See Patricia Hurtado, FBI Pulls Off ‘Perfect Hedge’ to Nab New 
Insider Trading Class, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-20/fbi-pulls-off-perfect-hedge-to-
nab-new-insider-trading-class.html. 
21. See Bharara, supra note 17, at 2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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requirements. Congress sought to limit the increasing use of 
wiretaps by, inter alia, limiting their application to cases where 
resorting to this invasive technique is considered “necessary.”22 
In order to establish the required “necessity” during the 
warrant application process, a government official applying for 
a wiretap warrant must provide “a full and complete 
statement” of those facts surrounding the investigation and 
why the government has been unsuccessful in its investigation, 
or why it would likely be unsuccessful if alternative techniques 
were tried.23 A recent trend has emerged, however, wherein 
courts analyzing a suppression motion have applied the 
constitutional standard of Franks v. Delaware24 to the 
statutorily-based necessity requirement.25 This has permitted 
the government to, in effect, obtain a wiretap warrant without 
the appropriate judicial pre-screening as mandated by Title III. 
In turn, this is likely to increase the use of wiretaps as an 
investigative technique because a wiretap applicant may now 
obtain a warrant based upon faulty information and justify its 
“necessity” after the fact. 
With the expanded use of wiretaps, courts will be faced in 
the coming years with questions concerning the contours of 
statutory authorization and the consequences of this expanded 
use into areas not traditionally associated with wiretap 
evidence. This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has already 
promised that its use of wiretaps will “‘continue to go up 
dramatically.’”26 This Article attempts to highlight some of the 
consequences of failing to strictly adhere to the statutory 
requirements of Title III, most importantly the predicate 
 
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012). 
23. Id. 
24. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 977 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cole, 
807 F.2d 262, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 
1484-85 (9th Cir. 1985). 
26. See Hilary Russ, DOJ Promises More Wiretaps in White Collar Cases, 
LAW360.COM (Nov. 4, 2010, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/206673/doj-promises-more-
wiretapsin-white-collar-cases. 
5
  
2013] EXPANDED USE OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE 1151 
offense and necessity requirements. It then suggests several 
ways to rebalance privacy interests in the larger context of 
wiretap use. Part II of this article will provide a brief history of 
wiretap jurisprudence leading up to the passage of Title III of 
the Crime Control Act in 1968.27 Part III will provide an 
overview of the current statutory scheme applicable to the use 
of wiretaps.28 Part IV will examine several recent trends in 
which wiretap evidence was used to obtain convictions for 
crimes not specifically listed in Title III and in which courts 
have adopted a constitutional analysis in determining whether 
evidence should be suppressed for a violation of the statutory-
based necessity requirement.29 Finally, Part V will discuss 
several alternative approaches courts could adopt in enforcing 
the strictures of Title III in order to more appropriately balance 
privacy interests as Congress originally intended.30 
 
II. The History of Wiretap Jurisprudence Leading up to Title 
III of the Crime Control Act 
 
The use of wiretaps extends as far back as the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century, and possibly even as far back as the 
late Nineteenth Century.31 It was not until 1928, in Olmstead 
v. United States,32 that the Supreme Court first visited the use 
of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.33 At the time Olmstead 
was decided, the Fourth Amendment was interpreted to protect 
against unwarranted trespass of a man’s house, his person, his 
papers and his effects—i.e., it protected material things.34 In 
Olmstead, the Court concluded that admitting into evidence 
information obtained by wiretap did not violate the Fourth 
 
27. See discussion infra Part II. 
28. See discussion infra Part III. 
29. See discussion infra Part IV. 
30. See discussion infra Part V. 
31. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-50 (1967) (recounting the 
early history of eavesdropping laws). 
32. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
33. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 50. 
34. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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Amendment.35 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
that telegraph and telephone messages were different in kind 
than those instrumentalities that were traditionally protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.36 
For the next thirty years, constitutional considerations 
played no role in determining whether the use of wiretap 
evidence was permitted in the prosecution of criminal 
defendants. In 1967, however, Olmstead was overruled by 
Berger v. New York37 and Katz v. United States.38 These cases 
shifted the paradigm of Fourth Amendment protection from 
one based on notions of physical invasion to one based on 
expectations of privacy.39 In Berger, the Court held for the first 
time that the Fourth Amendment was applicable when 
challenging the use of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.40 
More specifically, the Berger court concluded that a New York 
statute authorizing the issuance of a wiretap warrant was 
facially unconstitutional because it authorized eavesdropping 
“without requiring belief that any particular offense has been 
or is being committed,” and because it did not contain a 
particularity requirement.41 The Court recognized that “[b]y its 
very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy 
that is broad in scope,”42 and that “[f]ew threats to liberty exist 
which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping 
 
35. Id. at 466. 
36. See id. at 464-65. 
37. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
39. In Katz, the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.” Id. at 351. As such, “what he [or she] seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.” Id. at 351-52 (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). 
40. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 53-58. 
41. Id. at 58-59. The particularity requirement stems from the Fourth 
Amendment’s command that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
(emphasis added). “In the wiretap context, [the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity] requirements are satisfied by identification of the telephone 
line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be seized.” United States 
v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15 (1977). 
42. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56. 
7
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devices.”43 
During the thirty-year period between Olmstead and 
Berger, the statutory landscape regulating the use of wiretap 
evidence began to take shape. Despite rejecting any 
constitutional challenge to their use, Olmstead marked a larger 
shift in the use of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions by issuing 
a call to arms for Congress to act.44 The Olmstead Court stated: 
“Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone 
messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in 
evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and 
thus depart from the common law of evidence.”45 
Congress responded in 1934 by passing what became 
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act (FCA).46 
Section 605, as originally enacted, provided in relevant part: 
 
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or 
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any 
interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning 
thereof, except through authorized channels of 
transmission or reception, to any person other 
than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, . . . in 
response to a subpoena [sic] issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other 
lawful authority.47 
 
 
43. Id. at 63. 
44. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“In an ironic sense, although Katz overruled Olmstead, Chief 
Justice Taft’s suggestion in the latter case that the regulation of wiretapping 
was a matter better left for Congress has been borne out.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967). 
46. Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)); see also Berger, 388 U.S at 51 (“Congress 
soon thereafter, and some say in answer to Olmstead, specifically prohibited 
the interception without authorization and the divulging or publishing of the 
contents of telephonic communications.”). 
47. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1103. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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In its first landmark case addressing this statute, Nardone 
v. United States (“Nardone I”),48 the Supreme Court interpreted 
the term “any person” to include federal authorities; the Court 
refused to read into the statute an implied exception for federal 
officers who obtained wiretap evidence in violation of the 
statute.49 The Court read section 605 in accordance with its 
plain meaning such that it prohibited “anyone, unless 
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message, 
and directs in equally clear language that ‘no person’ shall 
divulge or publish the message or its substance to ‘any 
person.’”50 Moreover, the Court concluded that “[t]o recite the 
contents of the message in testimony before a court is to 
divulge the message.”51 Thus, federal prosecutors could not use 
wiretap evidence obtained in violation of section 605 in a 
criminal prosecution because Congress had specifically 
prohibited it.52 When the defendant in Nardone I again worked 
his way back to the Supreme Court two years later, the Court 
held that section 605 barred not only the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the FCA, but that it also barred the 
“fruits” derived from that evidence from being admitted.53 
Over the next three decades, section 605 played a central 
role in determining the admissibility of wiretap evidence in the 
federal courts. Numerous cases over this period addressed the 
reach and meaning of the statute. First, in Weiss v. United 
States,54 the Court concluded that section 605 applied to both 
interstate and wholly-intrastate communications.55 Three years 
later, the Court held that only a party to the recorded 
conversation had standing to object to its use in evidence.56 In 
Schwartz v. Texas,57 the Court held “that § 605 applies only to 
the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained 
 
48. Nardone v. United States (Nardone I), 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
49. See id. at 382-84. 
50. Id. at 382. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 383-85. 
53. See Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 
(1939). 
54. 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
55. See id. at 329. 
56. See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1942). 
57. 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 
9
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and sought to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not 
exclude such evidence in state court proceedings.”58 Schwartz 
treated section 605 as simply a “rule of evidence,” and reasoned 
that Congress did not unequivocally declare its intent to 
preempt state law in this area.59 The Court continued to treat 
section 605 as a rule of evidence in Benanti v. United States.60 
There, the Court determined that evidence unlawfully obtained 
in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in federal court 
despite the fact that it was obtained by state officials.61 In the 
same year Benanti was decided, the Court also held that no 
violation of the statute occurred where police had listened to a 
conversation with the permission of one of the parties.62 
Finally, in 1968, the year after the Court refocused its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence on the notion of privacy, the Court 
decided Lee v. Florida.63 In Lee, the Court overruled its 
previous decision in Schwartz and held that section 605 
rendered inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the 
FCA in state court prosecutions.64 
In response to the Court’s decisions in Berger and Katz65—
 
58. Id. at 203. 
59. Id. 
60. 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957). 
61. See id. at 100 (“[E]vidence obtained by means forbidden by Section 
605, whether by state or federal agents, is inadmissible in federal court.”). 
62. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 108, 111 (1957). 
63. 392 U.S. 378 (1968). 
64. See id. at 385-87. The Court reasoned that Schwartz was decided “in 
the shadow of Wolf v. People of State of Colorado.” Lee, 392 U.S. at 383 
(citation omitted). The Court in Wolf held that “in a prosecution in a State 
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the 
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.” Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). The Mapp Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was inadmissible in a state court prosecution. See Mapp, 367 
U.S. at 655. The Court in Lee thus subsequently concluded that “[i]n view of 
the Nardone and Benanti decisions, the doctrine of Schwartz v. State of Texas 
cannot survive the demise of Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado.” Lee, 392 
U.S. at 385. 
65. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (characterizing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 as a response the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 849 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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and just two days after the Court handed down its decision in 
Lee—Congress ushered in a new era for the use of wiretaps in 
criminal prosecutions by passing Title III of the Crime Control 
Act.66 Title III, among other things, rewrote section 605 to 
apply principally to communication personnel,67 and it set forth 
a separate regime for authorizing wiretaps by law enforcement 
authorities.68 
 
III. Title III: The Current Statutory Scheme 
 
In passing Title III Congress intended “to protect 
effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to 
protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, 
and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce.”69 
 
(2004) (arguing that the decisions in Berger and Katz, a wiretap and a 
bugging case respectively, “were carefully timed to influence the shape of 
statutory law”). 
66. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, Pub. 
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, §§ 801-802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012)). 
67. See id. § 803, 82 Stat. at 223-25 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 
605 (2012)). 
68. See id. § 802, 82 Stat. at 212-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-22 (2012)). 
69. See id. § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211; see also Gelbard v. United States, 
408 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1972). The court noted that: 
 
The Senate committee report that accompanied Title III 
underscores the congressional policy: ‘Title III has as it [sic] 
dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral 
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the 
circumstances and conditions under which the interception 
of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To 
assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III 
prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by 
persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers 
engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified types 
of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court 
order obtained after a showing and finding of probable 
cause.’ Hence, although Title III authorizes invasions of 
individual privacy under certain circumstances, the 
protection of privacy was an overriding congressional 
concern. 
 
11
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Congress achieved these goals by (i) “defin[ing] on a uniform 
basis the circumstances and conditions under which the 
interception of wire and oral communications may be 
authorized”; (ii) by “prohibit[ing] any unauthorized interception 
of such communications”; and (iii) by regulating “the use of the 
contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative 
proceedings.”70 In the years since 1968, Title III has been 
amended numerous times.71 
In its current iteration, Title III broadly prohibits the 
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications,72 and it makes doing so a crime punishable by 
a fine, a term of imprisonment, or both.73 In addition, Title III 
prohibits the use of wiretap evidence in any judicial, 
administrative, regulatory, and other similar proceeding if the 
communication was obtained in violation of federal law.74 Title 
III, however, does not entirely prohibit the use of wiretaps by 
law enforcement. Instead, Title III sets forth a comprehensive 
scheme that government officials must follow in order to secure 
an electronic surveillance order.75 
 
A. What Constitutes a Wiretap Under Title III 
 
The term “wiretap” is not used in Title III to describe the 
use of electronic eavesdropping devices.76 Rather, the scope of 
Title III is defined in terms of the type communication at issue, 
whether information from this protected communication is 
obtained or used by a third party, and the manner in which 
information from a protected communication is obtained.77 In 
common usage, the term “wiretapping” is thought to be 
“confined to the interception of communication by telephone 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
70. See § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211. 
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (amended in 1970, 1978, 1984, 
1986, 1994, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2008). 
72. See id. § 2511(1); see also Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 46. 
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a). 
74. See id. § 2515. 
75. See id. § 2518(1). 
76. See generally id. §§ 2510-2522. 
77. See id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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and telegraph and generally may be performed from outside 
the premises to be monitored.”78 This is in contrast to 
“bugging,” which generally refers to “the interception of all oral 
communications in a given location” and is typically 
“accomplished by installation of a small microphone in the 
room to be bugged and transmission to some nearby receiver.”79 
Title III regulates both wiretapping and bugging by prohibiting 
the “interception” and “disclosure” of “wire, oral, or electronic 
communications.”80 
 
 1. Protected Communications  
  
In order to fall under the purview of Title III, the 
communication at issue must be a protected communication. 
There are three different categories of communications 
protected against unlawful interference: wire communications, 
oral communications, and electronic communications.81 The 
statutory definitions provided for the types of communications 
regulated under Title III are broad in scope. 
A “wire communication” is expansively defined under Title 
III as: 
 
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part 
through the use of facilities for the transmission 
of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin 
and the point of reception (including the use of 
such connection in a switching station) furnished 
or operated by any person engaged in providing 
or operating such facilities for the transmission 
of interstate or foreign communications or 
communications affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.82 
 
78. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.1 (1979) (citation 
omitted). 
79. Id. (citations omitted). 
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
81. See generally id. § 2510. 
82. See id. 
13
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This definition includes spoken communication made over both 
land-based phone lines and cell phones.83 Importantly, 
however, a “wire communication” is limited to only the “aural 
acquisition” of information, which “literally translated mean[s] 
to come into possession through the sense of hearing.”84 
Therefore, information, such as the numbers dialed, that is 
transmitted via cell phone, other than the voices of the phone 
call participants, does not fall within the purview of Title III.85 
Rather, the numbers dialed, signaling information, and many 
other similar types of non-aural information transmitted via 
cell phone are governed by the Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Statute (“Pen Register Act”).86 
In contrast to a wire communication, “an oral 
communication is one carried by sound waves, not by an 
electronic medium.”87 Under Title III, “oral communication” is 
defined as “any oral communication uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not 
 
83. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 & n.7 (2001) (citing Nix v. 
O’Malley, 160 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1998); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 
1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
Roving Interception of Oral Communications, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“Despite the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, 
communications using cellular phones are considered wire communications 
under the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable connections 
when connecting calls.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3565; H. Rep. No. 99-647, at 31 
(1986); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524)). Telephone intercepts accounted for 
ninety-six percent of all intercepts installed by government investigators in 
2011, and the majority of these intercepts involved cellular phones. See 2011 
WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. 
84. Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (citation 
omitted); cf. United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Every 
circuit court to address the issue has concluded that Title III does not 
regulate silent video surveillance.”) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166 
(1977) (“Both the language of the statute and its legislative history establish 
beyond any doubt that pen registers are not governed by Title III.”). 
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. A “pen register” is defined under the Pen 
Register Act as “device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility 
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any 
communication.” Id. § 3127(3). 
87. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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subject to interception under circumstances justifying such 
expectation, but such term does not include any electronic 
communication.”88 The most important aspect of this definition 
is the expectation of privacy of those carrying on the 
conversation. As several circuit courts have noted: “The 
legislative history of Title III shows that Congress intended 
th[e] definition [of ‘oral communication’] to parallel the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’ articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Katz.”89 
Although wire communications and oral communications 
are conceptually distinct, it is possible for a communication to 
appropriately be characterized as both in certain situations.90 
As explained in one House Report: 
 
The definitions of wire communication and oral 
communication are not mutually exclusive. 
Accordingly, different aspects of the same 
communication might be differently 
characterized. For example, a person who 
overhears one end of a telephone conversation by 
listening in on the oral utterances of one of the 
parties is intercepting an oral communication. If 
the eavesdropper instead taps into the telephone 
wire, he is intercepting a wire communication.91 
 
Beyond regulating wire and oral communications, 
Congress responded to evolving technology by amending Title 
 
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
89. United States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 
S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178; 
United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also 
Larios, 593 F.3d at 92 (citing United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 57 (1st 
Cir. 2009)). Moreover, at least one circuit court has held that the definition of 
“oral communication” should “evolve” along with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. See Larios, 593 F.3d at 92-93. 
90. See United States v. Borch, 695 F. Supp. 898, 899, 901-02 (E.D. 
Mich. 1988) (oral communications intercepted via inadvertently open phone 
line are not wire communications), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United 
States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990). 
91. H. Rep. No. 99-647, at 34 (1986). 
15
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III to provide protection for all “electronic communications.”92 
With this addition, “authority to intercept electronic 
communications became subject to the same requirements as 
those applicable to the interception of oral and wire 
communications.”93 The term “electronic communication” 
includes “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole 
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce” with four limited exceptions.94 Some examples of 
electronic communications include “digital-display paging 
devices, fax machines, [and] text messaging.”95 Perhaps most 
importantly, the definition of “electronic communications” 
encompasses nearly all communications sent from a computer, 
including email. Courts have held, for example, that websites96 
and the submission of online forms97 fall within the definition 
of “electronic communication.” Not all communications 
originating on a computer, however, fall within this definition. 
At least one district court, in a fact-intensive analysis, 
determined that capturing keystrokes on a computer during 
the transfer of this information from the keyboard to the local 
 
92. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, tit. I, §§ 101-102, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-53 (1986). 
93. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516). 
94. Brown, 50 F.3d at 289 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)). These exceptions 
include: 
 
(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication 
made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any 
communication from a tracking device (as defined in [18 
U.S.C. § 3117]); or (D) electronic funds transfer information 
stored by a financial institution in a communications system 
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds. 
 
18 U.S.C. §2510(12). 
95. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. 
96. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 
2003); see also In re Pharmatrak Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing 
Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047; Konop, 302 F.3d at 876). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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computer’s hard drive was not an “electronic communication.”98 
The court’s reasoning in this case relied heavily on the fact that 
the keystrokes were recorded as they went from the keyboard 
to another internal part of the computer—i.e., the 
communication at issue was wholly internal to the computer 
system itself.99 This analysis seemingly suggests that the 
transmission of keystrokes over the internet—e.g., from a 
computer modem to a program such as Google—likely would 
fall within the definition of an “electronic communication.” 
Thus, it appears that while not all internal computer 
communications are covered by Title III, all internet 
communications of any stripe likely fall within its reach. 
 
 2. Prohibited Conduct  
  
Once it is established that a communication is covered by 
Title III, the “interception” of this communication is generally 
prohibited.100 Under the statute, to “intercept” “means the 
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.”101 This definition has 
two main elements: first, the contents of covered 
communication must be “acqui[red]” and second, this 
“acquisition” must occur by way of an “electronic, mechanical, 
or other device.”102 
Initially, courts throughout the country, largely relying on 
an influential case from the Fifth Circuit, interpreted the 
acquisition requirement narrowly to include only the 
“contemporaneous acquisition of the communication.”103 
 
98. See United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
99. See id. at 837-38. 
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012). 
101. Id. § 2510(4). 
102. See id. 
103. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976), 
superseded by statute Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), as recognized in United States v. Smith, 
155 F.3d 1051, 1057 n.11 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). The Turk court 
reasoned: 
 
The words acquisition . . . through the use of any . . . device 
17
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Congress, however, later amended the definition of “intercept” 
to include “aural or other acquisition,” as opposed to merely 
“aural acquisitions.”104 Similarly, Congress amended the 
definition of wire communications to include “any electronic 
storage of such communication.”105 Thus, the contemporaneity 
requirement is no longer required to “intercept” a wire 
communication as defined under Title III.106 Despite this, 
courts have continued to apply a contemporaneity requirement 
where electronic communications are at issue.107 The definition 
of electronic communication makes no reference to stored 
information.108 Courts have relied on this textual difference to 
conclude that it was “Congress’ understanding that, although 
one could intercept a wire communication in storage, one could 
not intercept an electronic communication in storage.”109 Stored 
electronic communications—e.g., emails stored on a computer 
server—are governed by a different statutory scheme called the 
Stored Communications Act, which was passed as Title II of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.110 
 
suggest that the central concern is with the activity engaged 
in at the time of the oral communication which causes such 
communication to be overheard by the uninvited listeners. If 
a person secrets a recorder in a room and thereby records a 
conversation between two others, an acquisition occurs at 
the time the recording is made. . . . [If] a new and different 
aural acquisition occurs each time a recording of an oral 
communication is replayed[, it] [] would mean that 
innumerable interceptions, and thus violations of [Title III], 
could follow from a single recording. 
 
Turk, 526 F.2d at 658. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
104. See § 101(a)(1)(3)(A), 100 Stat. at 1848 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(4)). 
105. See § 101(a)(1)(D), 100 Stat. at 1848 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(1)). 
106. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 
36 F.3d 457, 460-62 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 
302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). 
107. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 460 (citing Turk, 
526 F.2d at 658). 
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
109. Konop, 302 F.3d at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(collecting cases). 
110. See Stored Communications Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 
§ 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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In addition to the “acquisition” requirement, a 
communication is only “intercepted” within the meaning of 
Title III if the acquisition is done through an “electronic, 
mechanical, or other device.”111 This phrase is defined in a 
circular fashion as “any device or apparatus which can be used 
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.”112 There 
are two exceptions to this definition, neither of which is 
particularly relevant to the use of wiretaps by law 
enforcement.113 
 
B. Procedure for Obtaining a Wiretap Warrant by Law  
 Enforcement  
 
In addition to broadly prohibiting the use of wiretaps by 
those unassociated with law enforcement, Title III also sets out 
a detailed scheme that allows government officials to obtain a 
warrant permitting the use of covert electronic surveillance.114 
In promulgating this statutory scheme, Congress sought to 
balance two competing concerns. First, Congress recognized 
that “[t]he interception of [wire, oral, and electronic] 
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes 
or to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law 
enforcement and the administration of justice.”115 At the same 
time, however, Congress sought to protect the privacy of 
innocent individuals. Congress therefore determined that 
 
2701-2711). 
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5). 
112. Id. 
113. First, the “business extension use” exception permits the 
interception of wire communications where: (1) the equipment used 
“constitute[s] a ‘telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or 
a[] component thereof,’ either provided by, and installed by, [the service 
provider] in the ordinary course of its business or, equivalently, supplied by 
[the subscriber] for connection to [the service provider’s] facilities,” and (2) 
the use of that equipment “fall[s] within the ordinary course of [] business.” 
Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1994); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a). Second, “a hearing aid or similar device being used to 
correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal” may be used without 
violating Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(b). 
114. See id. § 2518. 
115. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968). 
19
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clandestine wiretap surveillance should occur “only when 
authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction” and that 
interception “should further be limited to certain major types of 
offenses and specific categories of crime.”116 
Before addressing the statutory scheme applicable to 
securing a wiretap warrant, it is important to note that a 
warrant is necessary only where all parties to the intercepted 
communication are unaware of the surveillance.117 Section 
2511(2)(c) of Title III provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . 
. for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, 
or electronic communication, where such person is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to the communication 
has given prior consent to such interception.”118 Thus, in many 
cases, the government must resort to the warrant-application 
procedures of Title III only where they have no cooperating 
witness to rely upon. Accordingly, prosecutors principally rely 
on the use of wiretaps only in complex criminal schemes, where 
discretion is paramount to the investigation. This can perhaps 
account for the relatively small (but increasing) number of 
authorized federal wiretaps throughout the country.119 
Generally speaking, once the Attorney General or another 
designated DOJ official has pre-approved the use of a 
wiretap,120 there are four main requirements that a 
government applicant must comply with in order to obtain a 
valid warrant under Title III. First, a specific predicate offense 
must be identified as the basis for the investigation.121 Second, 
the government must provide a full and complete statement of 
the facts and circumstances sufficient to establish probable 
cause and to satisfy a heightened particularity requirement.122 
Third, the use of a wiretap must be “necessary” to further the 
 
116. See id. § 801(d), 82 Stat. at 211-12. 
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). 
118. Id. 
119. In 2011, for example, the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts reported that only 792 court-authorized intercepts were granted at 
the federal level. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
120. See generally United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974) 
(discussing requirement); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). 
121. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1. 
122. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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government’s investigation.123 Finally, the government must 
reasonably minimize its interceptions to relevant 
communications.124 
 
 1. Predicate Acts 
 
Title III permits the use of wiretaps in the investigation of 
dozens of specifically enumerated federal criminal offenses.125 
The list of predicate offenses, however, is limited. For example, 
a number of fraud-based crimes are listed as predicate offenses, 
including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, bank 
fraud, and computer fraud.126 But other frauds, such as a 
securities fraud prosecution for insider trading, are not listed 
as predicate offenses.127 In addition to listing certain federal 
offenses, Title III also permits limited state offenses to be 
investigated using a wiretap so long as a separate state statute 
authorizes its use.128 These state offenses include “murder, 
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in 
narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other 
crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year.”129 
Although the investigation of a predicate crime is a 
necessary requirement for securing an electronic surveillance 
order, courts have permitted the use of wiretaps in the 
prosecution of crimes not specifically listed in Title III. As the 
United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
stated, “even if wiretaps could not be authorized for the 
purpose of investigating [certain] crimes, nothing in Title III 
 
123. See discussion infra Parts III.B.3. 
124. See discussion infra Parts III.B.4. 
125. For a list of predicate crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). An 
investigation into a conspiracy to commit any predicate offense may also 
serve as a valid basis for an electronic surveillance order under Title III. See 
id. § 2516(1)(t). 
126. See id. § 2516(1)(c). 
127. See generally United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *9-23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing 
relationship between wire fraud and securities fraud under Title III), aff’d, 
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). 
129. Id. 
21
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bars the use of the fruits of authorized wiretaps obtained in the 
pursuit of investigations of suspected crimes that are listed in 
Title III” during the prosecution of non-Title III crimes.130 This 
is specifically provided for in the statutory text: 
 
When an investigative or law enforcement 
officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, 
or electronic communications in the manner 
authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or 
electronic communications relating to offenses 
other than those specified in the order of 
authorization or approval, the contents thereof, 
and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed 
or used as [otherwise] provided.131 
 
This provision has been described as, “in essence[,] a plain-view 
exception [to the predicate offense requirement] allowing the 
government to present evidence of other crimes discovered 
while investigating an authorized offense.”132 
In order for the government to use this “otherwise 
intercepted” evidence at trial, however, the prosecutor must 
apply to a judge “as soon as practicable.”133 Title III does not 
itself define the applicable procedure for seeking subsequent 
approval. The congressional history of this provision, however, 
indicates that Congress thought that a subsequent application 
should show (i) “that the original order was lawfully obtained;” 
(ii) that the original application “was sought in good faith and 
not as [a] subterfuge search;” and, (iii) that the “otherwise 
intercepted . . . communication was in fact incidentally 
 
130. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2517(5)). 
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
132. Howard J. Kaplan et al., The History and Law of Wiretapping, ABA 
SECTION OF LITIG. 2012 SECTION ANNUAL CONFERENCE: THE LESSONS OF THE 
RAJ RAJARATNAM TRIAL: BE CAREFUL WHO’S LISTENING 6 (April 20, 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/mater
ials/sac_2012/29-1_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf; see 
also Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *9-10 (calling this 
statutory provision a “plain-view exception” (citing United States v. 
Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977); 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5))). 
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order.”134 
 
 2. Probable Cause and Particularity 
 
In addition to investigating a predicate offense, an 
investigating officer must support his or her application for an 
electronic surveillance order with enough information so that a 
neutral and detached judge might conclude that there is 
probable cause to issue the warrant. The statute specifically 
provides that an applicant for a wiretap warrant must include: 
 
[A] full and complete statement of the facts and 
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to 
justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense 
that has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed, (ii) except [in the case of a “roving” 
wiretap], a particular description of the nature 
and location of the facilities from which or the 
place where the communication is to be 
intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the 
type of communications sought to be intercepted, 
(iv) the identity of the person, if known, 
committing the offense and whose 
communications are to be intercepted.135 
 
The standard for establishing probable cause under Title 
III is co-equal with the standard generally applied for any 
regular search warrant;136 the “totality-of-the-circumstances” 
must reflect a “fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will 
 
134. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2189 (citations omitted). 
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b). 
136. Id. § 2518(3); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1977)); 
United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[S]tatutory 
probable cause standards set out in Title III are co-extensive with the 
constitutional requirements embodied in the fourth amendment [sic].”) 
(citations omitted). 
23
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be found.”137 A judge may issue a wiretap warrant only if he or 
she finds, in addition to “necessity,” probable cause to believe: 
(i) “that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about 
to commit a [predicate] offense;” (ii) “that particular 
communications concerning that [predicate] offense” are likely 
to be acquired through the permitted interception; and, (iii) 
that the location in which the interception is to occur is being 
used, or is about to be used, in connection with the predicate 
offense.138 
Unlike probable cause, the particularity requirements 
under Title III are more stringent than the requirements under 
the Fourth Amendment.139 “In the wiretap context, [the Fourth 
Amendment particularity] requirements are satisfied by 
identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the 
particular conversations to be seized.”140 Additional 
information, such as the name of the persons likely to be 
overheard, is not constitutionally required.141 Title III, 
however, requires that the following information be identified 
with particularity: 
 
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose 
communications are to be intercepted; 
(b) the nature and location of the 
communications facilities as to which, or the 
place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
(c) a particular description of the type of 
communication sought to be intercepted, and a 
statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to 
intercept the communications, and of the person 
authorizing the application; and 
(e) the period of time during which such 
 
137. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3); see also United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 
112, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Diaz, 176 F.3d at 110). 
139. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423, 430-31 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
140. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15 (1977). 
141. See id. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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interception is authorized, including a statement 
as to whether or not the interception shall 
automatically terminate when the described 
communication has been first obtained.142 
 
This list of particulars is significantly more detailed than 
that which is required under the Fourth Amendment. In 
certain situations, Title III provides for relaxed particularity 
requirements in the case of wire and electronic intercepts upon 
a showing of probable cause to believe that a party is avoiding 
intercepts at a particular site,143 or, in the case of oral 
intercepts, that providing the required specificity “is not 
practical.”144 In these situations, a “roving” wiretap warrant is 
issued, which allows investigators to target specific persons at 
various locations.145 “Roving” wiretaps are relatively rare, 
however, with only three federal and eight state-authorized 
“roving” wiretap warrants issued in 2011.146 These heightened 
particularity requirements have led as least one commentator 
to note that “direct constitutional challenges to wiretaps have 
rarely been litigated since the passage of Title III . . . because 
Title III itself provides broader grounds for the suppression of 
improperly obtained wiretap evidence than the exclusionary 
rule.”147 
 
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). 
143. See id. § 2518(11)(b). 
144. See id. § 2518(11)(a). 
145. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. 
146. See id. 
147. Kaplan et al., supra note 132 at 4; see also United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“After Katz, Congress did 
not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law 
governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a 
comprehensive statute, and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has 
been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.”) (internal citation 
omitted). Although “necessity” is not a constitutionally required prerequisite 
to a valid wiretap, its basis is found in the Court’s opinion in Berger. There, 
the Court stated: 
 
Finally, the statute’s procedure, necessarily because its 
success depends on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as 
do conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect 
by requiring some showing of special facts. On the contrary, 
25
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 3. “Necessity” Requirement 
 
Congress also included within Title III a requirement that 
law enforcement may resort to the use of wiretaps only when 
doing so is “necessary” to further the investigation.148 The 
necessity requirement was added to Title III by Congress “to 
assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where 
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the 
crime.”149 In other words, mandating that a “full and complete 
statement” regarding necessity be provided in the warrant 
application is designed “both to underscore the desirability of 
using less intrusive procedures and to provide courts with some 
indication of whether any efforts were made to avoid needless 
invasion of privacy.”150 Necessity in the absolute sense, 
however, is not required. Rather, Congress assumed that 
courts would apply this requirement “in a practical and 
commonsense fashion.”151 Therefore, although wiretaps should 
not be routinely used at the outset of an investigation, they 
also need not be used as only a last resort.152 
Before obtaining a warrant, a prosecutor must provide “a 
full and complete statement as to whether or not other 
investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or why 
they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to 
 
it permits uncontested entry without any showing of exigent 
circumstances. Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid 
notice would appear more important in eavesdropping, with 
its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional 
procedures of search and seizure are utilized. 
 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (emphasis added). 
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 
149. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974) (citing S. Rep. 
No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112). 
150. United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1983). 
151. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190. 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 
1978) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504 
(6th Cir. 2011) (“The requirement is intended to ensure that ‘the 
investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap techniques prior 
to applying for wiretap authority.’” (quoting United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 
158, 163 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted))). 
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be too dangerous.”153 A barebones or boilerplate affidavit is not 
sufficient.154 Similarly, “allegations that the crime being 
investigated is inherently difficult to solve will not, by 
themselves, suffice.”155 After proffering “a reasoned 
explanation, grounded in the facts of the case, and which 
squares with common sense,”156 an electronic surveillance order 
may be issued where the “judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that”157 clandestine electronic 
surveillance is needed for the investigation to progress.158 A 
judge’s decision as to the necessity of issuing a wiretap warrant 
is afforded considerable discretion; a wiretap warrant will not 
be later invalidated, for example, simply because a defense 
lawyer can point to some investigative technique that could 
have been but was not used.159 
 
 4. “Minimization” Requirement 
 
As another additional layer of protection for personal 
privacy, Title III contains several provisions meant to minimize 
the intrusion of government agents in private conversations. 
First, there are temporal limits on a wiretap warrant; no 
communication may be intercepted “in any event longer than 
thirty days.”160 If necessary, an extension may be sought, but 
the applicant must provide “a statement setting forth the 
results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable 
 
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 
154. See Martinez, 588 F.2d at 1231-32. 
155. Id. at 1231 (citations omitted); see also Lilla, 699 F.2d at 104 
(collecting cases). 
156. United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
158. See id. § 2518(3)(c). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1055 (5th Cir. 
1984) (quoting United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1978)); see 
also United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e 
grant considerable deference to the district court’s decision whether to allow 
a wiretap.”). 
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). Courts have generally authorized intercepts for 
the longest time permitted by Title III. In both 2010 and 2011, the average 
length of an original authorization was twenty-nine days. See 2011 WIRETAP 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
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explanation of the failure to obtain such results.”161 This way, 
an issuing judge is able to maintain supervision over the 
surveillance.162 Additional temporal protections provide that 
any interception must be done “as soon as practicable” and 
“must terminate upon attainment of the authorized 
objective.”163 
In a broad sense, Title III provides that electronic 
surveillance must be carried out in a fashion that “minimize[s] 
the interception of communications not otherwise subject to 
interception.”164 This requirement “does not forbid the 
interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but rather 
instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a 
manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such 
conversations.”165 Courts have long recognized that avoiding 
the interception of all innocent conversations is nearly 
impossible.166 For example, in 2011, an average wiretap 
surveillance scheme intercepted 3,716 communications, but 
only 868 of those communications were incriminating.167 
Partially because of this, investigators must do only what is 
reasonable, and there is no bright-line rule as to what is 
reasonable in this context.168 Instead, reasonableness is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.169 For example, the more 
wide-spread a conspiracy is the more covert surveillance is 
justified.170 Reasonableness must be looked at in the context of 
the entire wiretap surveillance scheme; it cannot be 
determined on a “chat-by-chat” basis.171 Moreover, the focus of 
 
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f); see also id. § 2518(5). The longest intercept 
permitted in 2011 lasted for 246 days and was used in a narcotics 
investigation. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
162. A judge may also require that progress reports be submitted. See id. 
§ 2518(6). 
163. Id. § 2518(5). 
164. Id. 
165. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). 
167. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.4. 
168. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 139-40. 
169. Id. at 140. 
170. Id. 
171. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *99 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (quoting United States 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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this inquiry should be on the actions of the government agent 
conducting the surveillance, not on his or her motives.172 The 
government has the initial burden to establish prima facie that 
its interceptions were reasonably minimized.173 After the 
government meets its burden, a defendant must prove that, 
“despite a good faith compliance with the minimization 
requirements, a substantial number of non-pertinent 
conversations have been intercepted unreasonably.”174 
 
C. Prohibition on Use of Wiretap Evidence Obtained in  
 Violation of Title III 
 
The penalties for improperly intercepting communications 
in violation of Title III are relatively severe. An individual 
subjects him or herself to up to five years in prison, as well as a 
fine, for unlawfully intercepting a protected communication.175 
In addition, no recordings obtained in violation of the statute 
may be admitted as evidence in a court proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 
2515 provides: 
 
Whenever any wire or oral communication has 
been intercepted, no part of the contents of such 
communication and no evidence derived 
therefrom may be received in evidence in any 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before 
 
v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir. 2013). But cf. United States v. Goffer, 756 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595-96 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Second Circuit has not definitively ruled on 
this issue, but stating that “district courts in [the Second] Circuit have 
favored the approach of suppressing only the improperly minimized calls” 
(citing United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Pierce, 493 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); United 
States v. King, 991 F. Supp. 77, 92 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. 
Orena, 883 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1995))). 
172. Scott, 436 U.S. at 139. 
173. Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *100 (citing United 
States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Menendez, No. S(3) 04 Cr. 219 (DAB), 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11367, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005); United States v. 
Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (2012). 
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any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, 
or other authority of the United States, a State, 
or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure 
of that information would be in violation of this 
chapter.176 
 
A wiretap performed in accordance with a judicially-
sanctioned wiretap warrant is not in violation of the statute so 
long as the application requirements of Title III are complied 
with.177 Suppression is appropriate, however, in three 
situations: “(i) [if] the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the 
interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval.”178 The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the contours on Title III’s suppression provision in 
only three cases, all of which were decided in the 1970s.179 
These cases are discussed more fully below.180 In the context of 
governmental investigations, courts have been increasingly 
forgiving of defects in the application process for electronic 
surveillance warrants. As some of the recently decided insider-
trading cases illustrate, this is a troubling trend likely to spur 
the increased use of wiretaps as a matter of course.181 
 
IV. Recent Developments and the Weakening of Title III’s 
Restrictive Provisions 
 
When Title III was originally promulgated, Congress 
appeared to go to great lengths to balance properly privacy and 
law-enforcement interests. As discussed above, several layers 
of protection were added to prevent government-secured 
electronic surveillance orders from becoming commonplace and 
 
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 
177. See generally id. §§ 2511-2522. 
178. See id. § 2518(10)(a). 
179. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. 
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974). 
180. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
181. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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from being overly intrusive.182 Recent developments, however, 
appear to indicate that the balance is decisively tilting away 
from privacy protection in favor of a more broad-based use of 
wiretap surveillance by law enforcement. A review of recent 
insider-trading cases indicates some troubling trends: first, the 
apparent scope of the types of cases that could be investigated 
using covert electronic surveillance has become unbounded;183 
second, courts have steadily weakened the standard for 
suppression under Title III—in part by conflating Title III and 
Fourth Amendment analyses—in apparent contradiction to 
several Supreme Court cases dating to the 1970s.184 
 
A. Plain View, Predicate Offenses, and the Expanding 
Landscape of Wiretap Surveillance 
 
In several recent securities fraud prosecutions, the 
defendants have sought to suppress wiretap evidence by 
arguing that securities fraud is not a predicate offense under 
Title III.185 To date, none of these challenges have been 
successful.186 This recent case law presents a troubling trend 
resulting in what effectively amounts to a presumption of good 
faith on behalf of prosecuting authorities in the investigation of 
almost any crime. This presumption is nearly impossible to 
overcome so long as (1) probable cause exists to investigate 
wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, or racketeering 
activity, and (2) the desire to investigate a related non-Title III 
offense is openly acknowledged in the wiretap warrant 
 
182. See supra Part III. 
183. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
184. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (discussing that Gupta 
argued that insider trading is not governed by Title III); United States v. 
Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (noting that motions by Raj Rajaratnam and 
Danielle Chiesi make roughly the same arguments, including that securities 
fraud is not a predicate offense under Title III), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
186. See Gupta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2 (stating that Judge 
Holwell’s opinion in Rajaratnam explained how insider trading is “an offense 
as to which wiretapping is authorized under Title III” (citing Rajaratnam, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19)). 
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affidavit.187 
Perhaps the case most indicative of this recent trend is a 
decision made by Judge Richard Holwell in the prosecution of 
defendants Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi.188 In this case, 
both defendants sought to suppress the wiretap evidence 
obtained by federal prosecutors by arguing, inter alia, that 
securities fraud—the crime for which both defendants were 
indicted—was not a predicate offense.189 In rejecting this 
argument, Judge Holwell found that probable cause existed to 
believe that the defendants were committing wire fraud and 
that the government acted in good faith in investigating this 
predicate offense.190 As a result, the incidental interceptions of 
evidence indicative of a securities-fraud scheme were subject to 
the plain-view exception contained in § 2517(5), and therefore 
this evidence was not suppressed.191 Although this conclusion is 
in some sense unsurprising given the statutory mandate of § 
2517(5), the collateral consequences of the reasoning 
underpinning this conclusion may have long-ranging effect. 
The defendants in the Rajaratnam case made three 
primary arguments seeking to suppress the wiretap intercepts 
on the basis that it was not a predicate offense: first, 
defendants argued that it was the securities fraud 
investigation, not the wire fraud investigation, that was the 
 
187. See, e.g., Gupta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2-3. The court 
stated: 
 
So long as the Government acts in good faith with respect to 
informing the Court of the crimes it is investigating and 
learning of in connection with the wiretap, as Judge Howell 
[sic] and this Court conclude was done here, the 
Government is free to use evidence obtained from an 
authorized wiretap in the prosecution of a crime not listed 
in § 2516. 
 
Id. 
188. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-8. 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi’s convictions were later upheld on appeal, although 
the Second Circuit did not address this argument in its opinion. See United 
States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 
189. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-2. 
190. Id. at *9-23. 
191. Id. 
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government’s primary purpose; second, even if securities fraud 
investigation was not the primary purpose, it was at least an 
anticipated consequence of electronic surveillance; and third, 
authorizing the interception of communications evidencing 
securities fraud would undermine congressional intent.192 
The court rejected the defendants’ first argument, stating 
that it “unrealistically assume[d] a gulf between” wire fraud 
and securities fraud.193 Although the court recognized that 
securities fraud and wire fraud have different elements that 
the government must prove to secure a conviction, the court 
nevertheless noted that “unlikely is the insider trading scheme 
that uses no interstate wires.”194 In fact, the court recognized 
that “[s]ometimes the government even charges both kinds of 
fraud for the same core conduct.”195 This presents a troubling 
reality, however, in an ever more “connected” world. What the 
court noted about the relationship between securities fraud and 
wire fraud can also be said about the relationship between wire 
fraud and a laundry list of other offenses not specifically 
subject to electronic surveillance under Title III. 
Although courts describe the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes in different ways, a federal prosecutor must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt five general elements in order to 
secure a conviction. The government must prove “that the 
defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the 
foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3) 
involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive 
another of, (5) either property or honest services.”196 Nearly 
 
192. Id. at *14. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at *15. 
195. Id. (citing H. Rep. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6043, 6074; United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987)). 
196. Charles Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal 
Criminal Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf [hereinafter Doyle, Mail and Wire 
Fraud]; see also United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that “the wire fraud statute is identical to mail fraud statute except that it 
speaks of communications transmitted by wire.”). The crime of wire fraud 
consists of several elements, notably (1) a scheme to defraud and, (2) the use 
of interstate wire communication to further the scheme. See, e.g., United 
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every white-collar criminal offense has the capacity to meet 
this definition so long as the jurisdictional element—i.e., the 
use of a wire or mail communication—is satisfied. 
Federal offenses that are distinct crimes but under certain 
circumstances could nevertheless also be prosecuted as wire 
fraud include: (1) the knowing submission of a false claim 
against the United States;197 (2) conspiracies to defraud the 
United States;198 (3) knowing and willfully making a material 
false statement on a matter within the jurisdiction of the 
federal government;199 (4) securities and commodities fraud;200 
(5) fraud in foreign labor contracting;201 (6) theft or bribery 
related to programs receiving federal funds;202 (7) violations of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;203 and (8) Medicare204 and 
Medicaid205 kickback schemes.206 None of these offenses, 
however, are predicate offenses under Title III.207 
The fact that the same primary conduct can serve as 
evidence in a prosecution under multiple federal criminal 
statutes is not unique to the wire fraud context. Judge Holwell, 
for example, noted in the Rajaratnam case that prosecutors 
had also named money laundering as a Title III predicate 
offense.208 The main federal money laundering statute, 18 
 
States v. Proffit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) 
(noting four elements); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted) (noting two elements); United States v. Faulkner, 17 
F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (noting two elements); 
United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) 
(noting three elements); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (noting two elements). 
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). 
198. See id. § 371. 
199. See id. § 1001. 
200. See id. § 1348. 
201. See id. § 1351. 
202. See id. § 666. 
203. See id. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-dd-3 (2012). 
204. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
205. See id. 
206. For a discussion of the crimes listed in notes 197-205, see generally 
Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud, supra note 196, at 14-23. 
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516. 
208. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir. 2013); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c). 
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U.S.C. § 1956, 
 
outlaws financial transactions involving the 
proceeds of other certain crimes—predicate 
offenses referred to as ‘specified unlawful 
activities’ (sometimes known as SUA)—
committed or attempted (1) with the intent to 
promote further [SUA] offenses; (2) with the 
intent to evade taxation; (3) knowing the 
transaction is designed to conceal laundering of 
the proceeds; or (4) knowing the transaction is 
designed to avoid anti-laundering reporting 
requirements.209 
 
There are three general categories of SUA offenses: state, 
foreign, and federal crimes.210 Similar to wire fraud, many of 
these SUA offenses are not listed as offenses subject to 
electronic surveillance under Title III. For example, the list of 
SUA offenses include the following crimes not generally subject 
to investigation using wiretap surveillance: fraud by or against 
a foreign bank;211 theft or bribery related to programs receiving 
federal funds;212 crimes related to fraudulent bank entries;213 
fraud in federal credit union entries;214 crimes related to 
Federal Deposit Insurance transactions;215 and numerous 
environmental crimes.216 There has also been recent 
consideration of naming tax evasion itself as a predicate 
 
209. Charles Doyle, Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 1956 
and Related Federal Criminal Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33315.pdf [hereinafter Doyle, Money 
Laundering]. 
210. See id. at 4-5. 
211. See 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii). 
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 666; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D). 
213. See id. § 1005; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D). 
214. See id. § 1006; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D). 
215. See id. § 1007; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D). 
216. These include crimes under the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2012), the Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1401-1445, 16 U.S.C. § 1447-1447f (2012), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2805, the Act to 
Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1905-1915, the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2012), and the Resources Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); see also 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(7)(E). 
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offense for money laundering; the Financial Action Task Force, 
a global body set up to fight money laundering, recently added 
“serious tax crimes” to its list of predicate money laundering 
offenses.217 
Most expansively, however, money laundering under § 
1856 also includes in its list of SUA offenses, any crime that 
can constitute a predicate offense under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act.218 
Violations of RICO may also independently serve as a basis for 
electronic surveillance under Title III.219 Regardless of whether 
RICO or money laundering is used as the gateway to a wiretap 
warrant, the list of RICO predicate offenses is staggering. 
Justice Scalia has derisively noted that the prosecutable 
offenses under RICO include “a laundry list of nearly every 
federal crime under the sun.”220 Thus, these four crimes—i.e., 
wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and racketeering—
all provide a backdoor into Title III for offenses that cannot 
otherwise be investigated using covert electronic 
surveillance.221 Moreover, under most circumstances these 
 
217. See David Jolly, International Crackdown on Tax Crimes 
Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at B4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/global/global-financial-task-
force-to-take-on-tax-cheats.html?_r=0. 
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A). For the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1961-1968 (2012). 
219. See id. § 2516(1)(c). 
220. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 223 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
221. The DOJ has specifically adopted this reading of the predicate 
offense requirement. See Brief for the United States of America at 55-56, 
United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr), 
2012 WL 1573547, at *55-56. They wrote: 
 
Insider trading violates various criminal statutes explicitly 
listed in Title III, including the wire fraud statute. In 
addition to wire fraud, Title III authorizes the interception 
of wire communications to seek evidence of money 
laundering. Both wire fraud and securities fraud are 
specified unlawful activities under the money laundering 
statute. Accordingly, certain financial transactions 
involving the proceeds of insider trading constitute money 
laundering. Title III also allows courts to authorize the use 
of wiretap recordings in the prosecution of crimes not listed 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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crimes can be the basis for nearly any white-collar criminal 
investigation and subsequent prosecution. 
As noted above, although Congress provided for what 
amounts to a plain-view exception to the predicate offense 
requirement, it also provided protection against abuse of this 
exception.222 Namely, a prosecutor must obtain court 
permission “as soon as practicable” in order to use wiretap 
evidence obtained incidentally when investigating a predicate 
offense.223 In line with the legislative history of Title III, courts 
have largely adopted a “good faith” standard for determining 
whether to admit otherwise intercepted evidence.224 
In the Rajaratnam case, Judge Holwell concluded that the 
government had acted in good faith, and not as a subterfuge for 
gathering evidence of securities fraud, because the government 
“candidly detailed the nature of the scheme for which wiretaps 
were sought.”225 “In other words,” Judge Holwell clarified, “the 
government made quite clear that it wanted to use wiretaps to 
investigate an insider trading conspiracy, and that the 
evidence would likely uncover evidence of wire fraud[,] money 
laundering . . . and securities fraud . . . .”226 This reasoning 
results in the perverse notion that the more blatant the 
government is in disclosing that its primary intent is to seek 
evidence of a non-predicate offense, the more likely the 
government will be in successfully using this evidence.227 The 
court implicitly concluded that, so long as probable cause exists 
to investigate a predicate offense, it did not matter whether 
investigating a non-predicate offense was the government’s 
primary goal.228 The Second Circuit recently embraced this 
 
in the statute. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
222. See supra Part III.B.1. 
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
224. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *11-15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (compiling cases), 
aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 
225. Id. at *12. 
226. Id. (citation omitted). 
227. See id. at 12-13. 
228. Id. 
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reality with open arms. The court in United States v. Goffer,229 
concluded that a representation that the government expected 
to uncover evidence of securities fraud in a wiretap application 
“ensured that the wiretaps were not obtained as a ‘subterfuge’ 
or to surreptitiously investigate crimes other than those about 
which they informed the court.”230 This statement seems to 
reveal that the Second Circuit understood the government to be 
investigating securities fraud when applying for the wiretap 
warrant at issue. 
Although the Second Circuit in Goffer did not explain the 
logic behind this conclusion, Judge Holwell in Rajaratnam did. 
In rejecting one argument made by the Defendants, Judge 
Holwell explained in a footnote that: 
 
The issuing judges did not know and could not 
have predicted that the government would 
ultimately charge the defendants with only 
securities fraud, not wire fraud or money 
laundering. But the government should not be 
required to charge the crime for which it obtains 
wiretap authorization. Although charging a 
defendant with the crime for which wiretapping 
was authorized is some evidence of the 
government’s good faith, the converse is not 
necessarily true. The government’s charging 
decisions depend on a variety of factors. That it 
decides not to charge a defendant with a crime 
for which it previously sought wiretap 
authorization does not imply it had no legitimate 
reason for a wiretap to begin with.231 
 
Judge Holwell then went on to reject the defendants’ 
second argument—i.e., that the securities fraud evidence was 
not obtained “incidentally”—because the government 
 
229. No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL 3285115, at *1 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013). 
230. Id. at *5. 
231. Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *13 n.5 (internal 
citations omitted). 
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anticipated its discovery.232 Despite recognizing that earlier 
cases had used the word “inadvertent” in dicta, the court 
dismissed this reading of the statute noting that the legislative 
history instead used the word “incidental” and concluded that 
“recent authority has implicitly rejected [the ‘inadvertent’] 
gloss on the standard.”233 This interpretation adopts the same 
standard applicable to the plain-view exception under the 
Fourth Amendment. In Horton v. California,234 the Supreme 
Court held that evidence found in plain view, the incriminating 
nature of which is immediately apparent, need not be 
suppressed where the investigating officers have a valid search 
warrant for the premises, despite the fact that the discovery of 
this evidence was not “inadvertent.”235 In other words, the 
plain-view exception does not require that the discovery of the 
evidence in plain view be an unexpected consequence of the 
otherwise valid search.236 
In practical effect, the standard of good faith adopted by 
the Rajaratnam court results in a presumption of good faith on 
behalf of the government that a defendant will rarely, if ever, 
be able to overcome.237 A criminal defendant is not likely to 
ever have access to subjective evidence of the intent of 
investigating authorities. Therefore, in nearly all instances, 
only objective evidence may be relied upon to attack the 
government’s good faith.238 The defendants in Rajaratnam 
 
232. See id. at *14-19. 
233. Id. at *17 (citing United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 701 (2d 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977); 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on John Doe, 889 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 
1989); United States v. Wager, No. 00 Cr. 629 (TPG), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17739, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2002); United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 
19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
234. 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
235. See id. at 133-37. 
236. See id. 
237. But cf. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(rejecting argument that suppression for failing to abide by the sealing 
provisions of Title III was draconian and unwarranted absent proof of actual 
tampering, in part because of the fear that editing and modification of 
wiretap evidence “can rarely, if ever, be detected”). 
238. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“Subjective intent, after all, is often demonstrated with objective 
evidence.”). 
39
  
2013] EXPANDED USE OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE 1185 
presented the court with two pieces of objective evidence: first, 
the government did not charge either defendant with a Title III 
predicate offense; and second, the government knew that it was 
likely to uncover incriminating evidence of securities fraud.239 
Taken together, these two pieces of evidence present, at the 
very least, a prima facie case that the government was 
engaging in a subterfuge search and never intended its 
investigation of wire fraud to be its primary objective. Even 
this evidence, however, was insufficient in the court’s eyes to 
suppress the fruits of the wiretap warrant.240 This is troubling 
because these two pieces of evidence will often be the only 
objective indication of the government’s intent a defendant is 
likely to have. Taking this conclusion—along with the backdoor 
route into Title III provided by investigations into mail fraud, 
wire fraud, money laundering, and racketeering—the flood 
gates to investigating non-Title III offenses are wide open. As 
long as the wiretap applicant readily acknowledges that an 
otherwise impermissible wiretap investigation is related to a 
permissible wiretap investigation, it will be nearly impossible 
for a defendant to prove bad faith. 
Other courts have adopted similar reasoning. During the 
prosecution of Rajat Gupta, the former head of the consulting 
company McKinsey & Co., and a co-conspirator of Raj 
Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi, Gupta’s lawyers made 
arguments nearly identical to that of Rajaratnam and Chiesi.241 
The court, however, fully accepted the reasoning of Judge 
Holwell.242 In the recent case of United States v. Levy,243 
another judge in the Southern District of New York adopted 
similar reasoning.244 Most recently, the Second Circuit has 
 
239. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
240. Id. at *19. 
241. United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45610, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Gupta offers no arguments 
different from the arguments Judge Holwell considered in the Rajaratnam 
case. He argues instead that Judge Holwell's conclusions are in error.”). 
242. Id. 
243. No. 1:(S5) 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2012 WL 5830631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
16, 2012). 
244. See id. at *3-10. 
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expressly put its stamp of approval on this reasoning.245 This 
emerging trend is likely to encourage government authorities 
to continue to expand the use of wiretaps in white-collar 
investigations not specifically listed under Title III. 
 
B. United States v. Giordano and the Movement away from 
Strict Compliance with the Necessity Requirement 
 
Another troubling trend has emerged in the context of 
Title III: courts are relaxing the statutory requirements of 
substantive wiretap application provisions—most importantly, 
the necessity requirement. As a result, courts rarely suppress 
evidence on the basis of the government’s failure to strictly 
abide by § 2518, which requires a “full and complete statement” 
by the applicant as to why a wiretap is necessary.246 For 
example, within the Second Circuit, there have only been two 
cases in which wiretap evidence was suppressed based on the 
government’s failure to prove necessity, and one of those cases 
was later reversed on appeal.247 This development seemingly 
contradicts a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 
1970s. Rather than applying the suppression standard 
expressed in United States v. Giordano248 and its progeny, 
courts have superimposed the Fourth Amendment standard 
expressed in Franks v. Delaware249 onto the statute-based 
necessity requirement. By ignoring the mandate of Giordano, 
these same courts have permitted wiretap applicants a ‘second 
bite at the apple’ that was not imagined within the framework 
of the statutory scheme. 
 
245. “When the government investigates insider trading for the bona 
fide purpose of prosecuting wire fraud, it can thereby collect evidence of 
securities fraud, despite the fact that securities fraud is not itself a Title III 
predicate offense.” United States v. Goffer, No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL 
3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (quoting Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, 
at *6). 
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012). 
247. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *89 n.26 (citing 
United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Concepcion, No. 07 CR 1095 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51386, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2008), rev’d 579 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
248. 416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
249. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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In Giordano, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he mature 
judgment of a particular, responsible Department of Justice 
official is interposed as a critical precondition to any judicial 
order” permitting the use of a wiretap.250 Therefore, “primary 
or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant 
to a court order issued in response to an application which was, 
in fact, not authorized by one of the statutorily designated 
officials must be suppressed.”251 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court stated that the issue of suppression under Title III 
“does not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule 
aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights, but 
upon the provisions of Title III.”252 The Court then noted that § 
2515 mandates the exclusion of wiretap evidence form judicial 
proceedings “if the disclosure of that information would be in 
violation of this chapter,” and that § 2518(10)(a) in turn 
supplies three statutory grounds for suppression.253 These 
three grounds for suppression include: “(i) if the communication 
was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or 
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its 
face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with 
the order of authorization or approval.”254 
 
250. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515-16. The Court reasoned that this 
requirement was intended to hold certain public officials politically 
accountable. See id. at 516-23. The specific statute in place at the time of the 
Giordano decision was later amended to include, in addition to certain DOJ 
officials requiring Senate confirmation, “[t]he Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney 
General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Criminal Division or National Security Division specially designated by the 
Attorney General.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). As the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 
abrogated by Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), under the 
current statute “[i]t would perhaps be more accurate, then, to attribute to 
Congress the purpose of limiting such authority to identifiable officials in 
positions of trust.” Anderson, 39 F.3d at 339 n.6. 
251. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 508. 
252. Id. at 524; see also Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 986 
(6th Cir. 2001) (“Congress made [Title III] the primary vehicle by which to 
address violations of privacy interests in the communications field. . . . All 
such constitutional questions are pretermitted.”). 
253. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). 
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In interpreting these three grounds for suppression, the 
Court determined “that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) must be 
deemed to provide suppression for failure to observe some 
statutory requirements that would not render interceptions 
unlawful under paragraph (i).”255 This, however, does not mean 
“that no statutory infringements whatsoever are also unlawful 
interceptions within the meaning of paragraph (i).”256 
Therefore, although subsection (i) undoubtedly permits 
suppression for violations of the Fourth Amendment, it also 
permits suppression for certain statutory violations as well.257 
The Court then set forth the governing standard for what 
constitutes an “unlawful” interception under the first prong of § 
2518(10)(a): 
 
[W]e think Congress intended to require 
suppression where there is failure to satisfy any 
of those statutory requirements that directly and 
substantially implement the congressional 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the 
employment of this extraordinary investigative 
device . . . [Where a requirement] was intended 
to play a central role in the statutory scheme[,] . . 
. suppression must follow when it is shown that 
this statutory requirement has been ignored.258 
 
In reconciling legislative history by indicating that § 
2518(10)(a) was meant to “largely reflect[] existing law” but at 
the same time “serve to guarantee that the standards of [Title 
III] will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and 
oral communications,” the Court held that “it would not extend 
existing search-and-seizure law for Congress to provide for the 
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of explicit 
statutory prohibitions.”259 
 
255. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 527-28. 
259. Id. at 528-29 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court revisited the issue of suppression 
under Title III in the same year that Giordano was decided. In 
United States v. Chavez,260 the Court concluded that evidence 
derived from a wiretap need not be suppressed where the 
Attorney General authorizes the wiretap application but where 
the application and order both incorrectly identify an Assistant 
Attorney General as the authorizing official.261 “Under § 2515, 
suppression is not mandated for every violation of Title III . . . 
.”262 In Chavez, “the misidentification of the officer authorizing 
the wiretap application did not affect the fulfillment of any of 
the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress.”263 
Rather, the requirement that the authorizing official be named 
was meant to serve a reporting requirement and to hold this 
official publicly responsible for the wiretap; it did not provide 
an essential or functional role in protecting against 
unwarranted wiretap use.264 In dicta, the Court concluded that 
despite the outcome of this particular case, “strict adherence by 
the Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless 
be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has 
imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or 
electronic surveillance is sought.”265 The Court has since 
“reemphasize[d]” this.266 
Both Giordano and Chavez set forth the applicable 
framework for suppression under Title III, and only one other 
case has been considered by the Supreme Court under this 
framework.267 In United States v. Donovan, the Court held that 
 
260. 416 U.S. 562 (1974). 
261. Id. at 565. 
262. Id. at 575. 
263. Id. 
264. See id. at 577-79. 
265. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
266. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 439-40 (1977). 
267. In 1974, the Court also decided United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 
(1974), which held that the government’s failure to name a party in the 
application whose conversation was likely subject to interception did not 
require suppression where the government did not have probable cause to 
believe that the un-named person was committing the offense under 
investigation. See id. at 155. In other words, “Title III requires the naming of 
a person in the application or interception order only when the law 
enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that that individual is 
‘committing the offense’ for which the wiretap is sought.” Id. This decision, 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
  
1190 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
the government’s failure to strictly adhere to the following non-
substantive provisions of Title III does not make subsequent 
intercepts “unlawful” and therefore does not require 
suppression: (1) the identification of all those likely to be heard 
during the intercept, as required under § 2518(1)(b)(iv)268; and 
(2) the “duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted,” as required pursuant to 
§ 2518(8)(d).269 In reaching this conclusion the Court continued 
to place an emphasis on the statutory preconditions that help 
both the Justice Department and the issuing judge in 
determining whether a wiretap is appropriate in a given case. 
In other words, emphasis is placed on those provisions that 
were “intended to serve as an independent restraint on resort 
to the wiretap procedure.”270 For example, the Court stated 
that the intercept at issue in Chavez “was lawful because the 
Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, 
and the instant intercept is lawful because the application 
provided sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to 
determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied,” 
regardless of whether or not certain people were identified in 
the application.271 To a lesser degree, the Court has also placed 
emphasis on the government’s intent in failing to abide by the 
statutory provisions,272 although the Court has never expanded 
 
however, focused more on the statutory text of §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and 
2518(4)(a), not on Title III’s suppression provision. See generally id. at 152-
58. Similarly, the Court briefly discussed suppression in Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), but ultimately did not need to interpret § 
2518(10)(a) because it concluded that there was no statutory violation of the 
minimization requirement. See id. at 142-43. 
268. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 435-37. 
269. Id. at 438. 
270. Id. at 439; see also United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (finding that the requirement of judicial sealing immediately upon 
the expiration of the authorizing order was designed to limit the use of 
intercept procedures and was therefore central to the statutory scheme and 
rejecting argument that suppression for failing to abide by this requirement 
was unwarranted and draconian in light of the “carefully planned strictures 
on the conduct of electronic surveillance”). 
271. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436. 
272. See, e.g., id. at 436 n.23. Here, the court stated: 
 
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government 
agents knowingly failed to identify [defendants] for the 
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upon this.273 
The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of 
suppression under Title III since the 1970s. Despite the fact 
that the Court’s suppression analysis focuses on whether each 
statutory requirement is directly related to limiting the use of 
wiretaps, lower federal courts have recently weakened this 
standard. In the context of the “necessity” requirement, several 
circuit courts have adopted a Franks274 analysis in determining 
whether wiretap evidence should be suppressed.275 Similarly, 
the district court in the Rajaratnam prosecution used this 
analysis, and the Second Circuit later affirmed.276 In the 
context of the necessity requirement, a Franks analysis 
requires suppression where the defendant, after an evidentiary 
hearing, can prove (1) that a misstatement or omission 
regarding the issue of necessity in the government’s application 
was the result of a “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard 
for the truth”; and (2) that the omitted or erroneous 
information was material to the district court’s finding of 
necessity.277 
 
purpose of keeping relevant information from the District 
Court that might have prompted the court to conclude that 
probable cause was lacking. If such a showing had been 
made, we would have a different case. 
 
Id. 
273. But cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13 (1978) 
(discussing the role of motive under a Fourth Amendment suppression 
analysis). 
274. A Franks analysis refers to the case Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154 (1978). Franks was decided on constitutional grounds. See id. at 155-56. 
275. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549-51 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 716-18 (6th Cir. 2007) (Bell, C.J., 
dissenting); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Guerra-Marez, 
928 F.2d 665, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 
267-68 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 
1985). Another circuit has expressly refrained from deciding this issue. See 
United States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2010). 
276. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *69-94 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
277. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 
2013) (quoting United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717–18 (2d Cir. 2000); 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
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Surprisingly, almost none of the cases that have used this 
standard have discussed it within the context of the 
suppression analysis from Giordano and its progeny. The 
leading case on this issue in the First Circuit, for example, cites 
Giordano once, but does so for a proposition unrelated to the 
issue of suppression.278 Likewise, the first case from the Ninth 
Circuit applying this standard only mentions Giordano once in 
passing,279 while at least three other cases from that circuit 
applying this standard fail to directly cite to Giordano at all.280 
Similar statements can be made with respect to decisions from 
the Fifth Circuit,281 the Second Circuit,282 the Third Circuit,283 
 
see also United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Under 
[the Franks] standard, the defendant must show that any misstatements 
were made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, and that the erroneous 
information was material to the district court’s finding of necessity.”). 
278. See Cole, 807 F.2d at 267-68 (discussing Giordano in relation to 
finding that a judge needs to make prior to authorizing a wiretap). 
279. See Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486. The court in Ippolito did state, 
however, that 
 
[b]ecause the challenged statements in the wiretap 
application at issue deal with the necessity or alternative 
methods requirement for obtaining a wiretap, it is first 
necessary to determine whether necessity is an essential, 
congressionally warranted requirement, and not merely a 
factor meant to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties 
involved in the use of conventional techniques. 
 
Id. at 1485 (quoting United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 
1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This sounds in some respects 
similar to a Giordano analysis. 
280. See Shryock, 342 F.2d at 976-77; United States v. Blackmon, 273 
F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 
1121-26 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 
1472-73 (9th Cir. 1987) (not citing Giordano and concluding that “the specific 
facts withheld from the issuing judge about this particular investigation 
reveal that traditional techniques could have led to the successful infiltration 
of the entire enterprise.”). 
281. See United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 669-71 (5th Cir. 
1991) (not citing Giordano). 
282. See United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing the necessity requirement without a Giordano analysis); United 
States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing suppression for 
failure to abide by the necessity requirement but without discussing 
Giordano), abrogation recognized by United States v. Al Jaber, 436 F. App’x 
9, 12 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126-27 
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the Sixth Circuit,284 the D.C. Circuit,285 and the Tenth 
Circuit.286 The application of Giordano to the necessity 
requirements of Title III was directly addressed by the Second 
Circuit in Rajaratnam, with the court ultimately concluding 
that Giordano did not preclude the application of a Franks 
analysis to the necessity requirement.287 The Court reached 
this conclusion, however, largely by relying on previous case 
law that did not fully analyze the application of Giordano.288 
At least one circuit has recognized the heavier burden that 
Title III places on the government vis-à-vis the Fourth 
Amendment. In United States v. Rice,289 the court adhered 
more closely to the Giordano line of reasoning. The Sixth 
Circuit, after citing to Giordano, stated that “[b]ecause the 
necessity requirement is a component of Title III, and because 
suppression is the appropriate remedy for a violation under 
Title III, where a warrant application does not meet the 
necessity requirement, the fruits of any evidence obtained 
through that warrant must be suppressed.”290 The court then 
 
(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the application of the Franks analysis to Title III’s 
“roving” wiretap requirements, and citing to § 2518(10)(a) but failing to 
mention Giordano), abrogation recognized by United States v. Galpin, No. 11-
4808-cr., 2013 WL 3185299, at *7 (2d Cir. 2013). 
283. See United States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(noting that most circuits have adopted Franks analysis in the context of the 
necessity requirement, refusing to address the issue because the defendant 
had failed to even make a preliminary showing under Franks, and not 
mentioning Giordano). 
284. See United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304-05 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that Franks applied to challenges based on the necessity 
requirement without discussion and without citing Giordano); see also United 
States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 503-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); United States 
v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 716-18 (6th Cir. 2007) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (same). 
285. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549-51 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (applying Franks to a necessity challenge without citing to Giordano or 
its progeny). 
286. See United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(failing to cite Giordano); see also United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828-
29 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). 
287. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 152 (2d Cir. 2013). 
288. Id. at 151-52 (citing United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126 
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also 
id. at 152 n.16 (collecting cases). 
289. 478 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2007). 
290. Id. at 710. 
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performed a Franks analysis and “reformed [the warrant 
application] for its factual deficiencies,” by simply ignoring the 
false information.291 Importantly, however, the Rice court then 
went on to reject the Government’s argument that the wiretap 
evidence, even if obtained in violation of Title III, should 
nevertheless be admitted based on the good faith exception of 
United States v. Leon.292 Rather, the court concluded that “the 
good-faith exception to the warrant requirement is not 
applicable to warrants obtained pursuant to Title III” based 
upon both the statute’s text and legislative history.293 On this 
point, the court reasoned: (i) “[t]he statute is clear on its face 
and does not provide for any exception”; (ii) Leon was decided 
sixteen years after the passage of Title III and therefore 
“Congress obviously could not know that Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure law would embrace a good-faith exception”; 
and (iii) in contrast to the exclusionary rule “Congress has 
already balanced the social costs and benefits and has provided 
that suppression is the sole remedy for violations of the 
statute.”294 Although the court still utilized a Franks analysis 
 
291. Id. at 711. 
292. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Rice, 478 F.3d at 711-14. 
293. Rice, 478 F.3d at 711. At least three other circuits have reached a 
different conclusion. See United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376-77 (8th Cir.1994); United 
States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988); see also United 
States v. Solomonyan, 451 F. Supp. 2d 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United 
States v. Mullen, 451 F. Supp. 2d 509, 530-31 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). In United 
States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit made 
note of this split authority and specifically declined to decide whether there 
was a good-faith exception to the necessity requirement. Id. at 185 n.21. 
294. Rice, 478 F.3d at 713. In another case, the Ninth Circuit declared 
that there is a two-step approach to reviewing necessity determinations, the 
first step of which entails “review[ing] de novo whether the application for 
wiretapping was submitted in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).” 
United States v. Garcia-Villalba, 585 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002)). This 
standard, however, appears only to apply where only the facial sufficiency of 
the warrant application is challenged and not its factual validity. See United 
States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In reviewing whether an 
affidavit contains a full and complete statement of facts in compliance with § 
2518(1)(c), we assess whether the affidavit attests that adequate 
investigative tactics were exhausted before the wiretap order was sought or 
that such methods reasonably appeared unlikely to success or too 
dangerous.”) (reaffirming United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 
1985)); see also Garcia-Villalba, 585 F.3d at 1227-35 (not presenting a 
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for the necessity requirement, its reasoning on the issue of a 
good-faith exception is more closely aligned with the reasoning 
underpinning Giordano.295 
Although at least one court has shown hints of adopting a 
more Giordano-like analysis, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Rice failed to fully repudiated the applicability of Franks to the 
necessity requirement. Applying a Franks analysis to the 
necessity requirement shifts the burden of proving necessity 
away from the government and onto the defendant challenging 
the warrant: defendants must now prove falsity or omission, 
and that the information is material. For example, courts have 
consistently concluded that where the government applies for 
an electronic surveillance order, it “must overcome the 
statutory presumption against granting a wiretap application 
by showing necessity.”296 In other words, the government has 
the burden of establishing the necessity of a wiretap to its 
investigation. But, applying a Franks analysis to the necessity 
requirement has the effect of taking the burden of proof on the 
issue of necessity away from the government. Under Franks, a 
defendant has the burden of first proving the knowing, 
intentional, or reckless falsity of the affidavit, and then they 
have the additional burden of proving that this false or omitted 
information was material to the court’s determination of 
 
challenge to the factual statements in the warrant application); McGuire, 307 
F.3d at 1197 (same). 
295. For example, the argument that Leon is not applicable to Title III 
because it was decided years after Title III’s adoption can also be applied to 
Franks. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8-9, United States v. 
Rajaratnam, No. 11-4416-cr, 2013 WL 3155848, at *1 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013) 
(No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 1903399, at *8-9 (“Giordano predates Franks 
because Title III predates Franks. And that means that the Congress that 
adopted Title III could not possibly have intended for its straightforward 
statutory text to be so sweepingly countermanded by a Franks doctrine of 
which it had never heard.”). This argument, however, has been rejected by 
the Second Circuit. See Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 152; see also United States v. 
Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126 (2d Cir. 1993). 
296. Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486 (citations omitted). This is a different 
question from the question of who has the burden of proof in overturning a 
district court order granting a wiretap warrant after the court has made a 
finding of necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 
(RJH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *87 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (citing 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
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necessity.297 Thus, the government can secure a wiretap 
warrant by recklessly or intentionally failing to provide a “full 
and complete statement” establishing necessity and then shift 
the burden to the defendant to essentially disprove necessity 
based upon what a “full and complete statement” would 
otherwise reveal. This weakens the statutory purpose of the 
necessity requirement, which is to discourage use of wiretaps 
as a matter of course. This burden shift is thus likely to 
aggravate the trend towards increased use of wiretaps by law 
enforcement. 
 
V. Re-Establishing Privacy as a Cardinal Principle Through 
Vigorous Judicial Enforcement of Title III’s Substantive 
Requirements 
 
With the expanded use of wiretaps in white-collar 
prosecutions, it becomes more important than ever for the 
judiciary to act as a bulwark against prosecutors seeking to 
engage in covert electronic surveillance beyond what Congress 
sought to permit. By more vigorously enforcing the 
requirements of Title III that are meant to limit the use of 
wiretaps, courts can rebalance privacy and law-enforcement 
concerns more in line with congressional intent. Several recent 
developments in white-collar criminal prosecutions indicate 
two important changes are needed. First, courts must more 
strictly enforce the predicate offense requirement by refocusing 
on the limitations imposed on use of the plain-view exception. 
Courts can accomplish this through closer supervision of the 
“subsequent application” process or, alternatively, courts could 
allow criminal defendants to more easily challenge the 
government’s good faith application of the plain-view exception 
through an evidentiary hearing or by adopting a burden-
shifting analysis. Second, courts must hold the government to 
its burden of establishing necessity through strictly enforcing 
the government’s obligation to provide a “full and complete 
statement” of investigatory facts indicating that a wiretap is 
necessary in a given case. Courts must reject the continuing 
use of a constitutionally-based Franks analysis to the necessity 
 
297. See, e.g., Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *70. 
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requirement because this analysis weakens statutory 
protections. In reasserting its authority by adopting these 
changes, the judiciary can once again buttress against 
excessive wiretap use by prosecutors as Congress originally 
intended when it enacted Title III. 
 
 
A. Restraining the Plain-View Exception to the Predicate 
Offense Requirement 
 
A number of statutory requirements contained in Title III 
are specifically meant to discourage the use of wiretaps as a 
matter of course by law enforcement. The predicate offense 
requirement is one of these requirements.298 As discussed 
above, however, the predicate offense requirement, along with 
its restrictive force, is in danger of becoming a dead letter.299 In 
order to breathe new life into this requirement’s ability to 
adequately protect privacy interests, the plain-view exception 
must be limited in some manner. To appropriately achieve this 
limitation, judicial supervision over wiretap investigations 
must be increased or, alternatively, after some minimal 
showing by the defendant, the burden must be placed on the 
government to justify its assertion of good faith where it seeks 
to use Title III’s plain-view provision. 
 
 1. The Judicial Supervision Approach 
 
One possible avenue to appropriately limit excessive use of 
wiretaps would be to increase judicial supervision over the 
ongoing wiretap investigation. This can be done fully in line 
with the statutory text, but several hurdles exist that make 
this approach unlikely to succeed. 
First, it must be noted that the plain-view exception to the 
predicate offense requirement is statutorily based.300 As such, 
it cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to be effectively read 
out of the statute itself. This does not mean, however, that the 
 
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012). 
299. See supra Parts III.B.1, IV.A. 
300. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
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use of this exception cannot be restricted at all. Congress itself 
thought that certain restrictions were appropriate by providing 
that any “plain view” evidence obtained during a wiretap 
investigation, if it is to be used at trial, must be brought to the 
a judge’s attention “as soon as practicable.”301 Congress further 
believed that this subsequent application should establish the 
following: 
 
[i] that the original order was lawfully obtained, 
[ii] that [the original order] was sought in good 
faith and not as a subterfuge search, and [iii] 
that the [otherwise intercepted] communication 
was in fact incidentally intercepted during the 
course of a lawfully executed order.302 
 
Courts could more appropriately enforce this provision in 
accordance with congressional intent by placing increased 
emphasis on the requirement that an investigative officer 
apply to use this evidence in a subsequent proceeding “as soon 
as practicable.” By using the phrase “as soon as practicable,” 
Congress implicitly suggested that the timing of this 
application was an important consideration.303 Restricting the 
time frame in which such an application can be made would 
both fully comply with the statutory mandate and allow courts 
greater supervision over ongoing wiretap intercepts. 
Close judicial supervision of ongoing electronic surveillance 
was specifically envisioned by Congress.304 In passing Title III, 
Congress made an explicit congressional finding that “[t]o 
safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of 
[protected] communications . . . should remain under the 
control and supervision of the authorizing court.”305 This same 
 
301. See id. 
302. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2189. 
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
304. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“Congress, in enacting Title III . . . prescribed specific and detailed 
procedures to ensure careful judicial scrutiny of the conduct of electronic 
surveillance and the integrity of its fruits.”). 
305. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, 
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intent is shown in other statutory provisions of Title III, such 
as the re-authorization and extension provisions of §§ 
2518(1)(f)306 and 2518(5).307 
Under the increased judicial supervision approach, 
although no bright-line rule would need to be adopted, a 
subsequent application to use evidence obtained by wiretap at 
trial should be submitted within a period of a few days. By 
permitting increased judicial supervision such as this, a judge 
can more accurately determine whether Title III is being used 
as a mere subterfuge to investigate a non-Title III offense. Put 
differently, being presented with the “plain view” evidence 
derived from wiretap intercepts on an ongoing basis allows a 
court to make a more reasoned determination of whether the 
primary focus of an investigation is on a Title III predicate 
offense or on a non-Title III offense. For example, if a wiretap 
intercepts troves of evidence concerning insider trading, but 
only very limited evidence of wire fraud, a judge is in a better 
position to determine whether wire fraud is being used as a 
mere gateway to investigate insider trading. In this situation, a 
judge may appropriately decide that the securities fraud 
investigation is the primary purpose of the wiretap 
investigation and revoke the issued warrant or refuse to extend 
it. 
There are several major drawbacks to this approach. First, 
and perhaps most importantly, as Judge Holwell noted in the 
Rajaratnam case, the evidence used to prosecute wire fraud 
and the evidence used to prosecute a non-predicate offense, 
such as securities fraud, is often one and the same.308 There is 
rarely a clear distinction between evidence indicative of 
securities fraud scheme that is carried out over interstate wires 
and evidence indicative of wire fraud. It would likely be 
difficult for a judge to discern the government’s true intent at 
this stage of the investigation. It is not until textual, objective 
clues emerge later on that the government’s investigatory 
 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(d), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968). 
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f). 
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
308. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
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intent becomes clearer. 
There are also other problems with this approach that 
would likely undercut its effectiveness. For instance, allowing 
only a short period of time between intercept and the 
subsequent application to use this evidence means that the 
subsequent application would, in most cases, be made prior to 
an indictment. Therefore, this subsequent application would be 
submitted ex parte and the suspect would not have an adequate 
opportunity to contest it prior to it being approved by a court. 
Although this raises serious due process concerns, there may 
be ways that these concerns may be avoided or minimized. One 
possible approach would be to allow a challenge to this 
subsequent application after it has been approved. This way, 
the judicial approval of the subsequent application would act 
much like a typical search warrant. But because a judge’s 
decision that is not based on a strict question of law is 
generally afforded considerable deference on review, this 
decision would likely be given a presumption of validity and the 
burden would be on the defendant to attack its veracity in some 
regard. A defendant would therefore attack this approval in the 
same or a similar manner as the defendants in Rajaratnam 
did, although such defendants would have to overcome a higher 
burden due to the presumption of validity afforded to this 
earlier decision. Another possible disadvantage to this 
approach is that it blurs the line between the prosecution and 
the judiciary. Courts are often apprehensive to closely 
scrutinize an ongoing investigation for fear of wading into 
areas better left to prosecutorial discretion.309 It therefore 
remains unclear whether courts would embrace this 
supervisory power vigorously enough to adequately restrict the 
use of wiretaps. To date, courts have shown little willingness to 
reasonably restrict the use of § 2517(5)’s plain-view 
exception,310 and there is no indication that courts would do so 
 
309. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: 
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 
(2001) (“The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the broad exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion—a power that affords prosecutors far-reaching 
control over the outcome of criminal cases.”). Davis asserts in the context of 
wiretaps that “Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the Court will 
continue to defer to prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 460. 
310. See supra Part IV.A. 
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under this alternative approach. Ultimately, any approach 
relying on closer judicial supervision of an ongoing 
investigation is likely to prove ineffective. 
 
 2. The Burden Approach 
 
A more reasonable and practical approach to restricting 
wiretap use to appropriate cases would be for courts to focus 
more heavily on whether the government acted in good faith, 
which is a necessary requirement to make use of the plain-view 
exception.311 To appropriately limit the over-use of wiretaps, 
this would require courts to place the greatest burden on the 
government to justify its good faith, as opposed to placing the 
greatest burden on the defendant to challenge the 
government’s good faith. As discussed above, the plain-view 
exception has been interpreted in such a way so as to 
effectively create a presumption of good faith on behalf of the 
government that, under most circumstances, is nearly 
impossible for a criminal defendant to overcome.312 There are 
two possible standards courts could adopt to reverse this trend: 
first, courts could permit an evidentiary hearing into the 
government’s good faith once a defendant makes an initial 
showing justifying such a hearing; and second, courts could 
adopt a burden-shifting analysis that forces the government to 
prove its good faith application of the plain-view exception after 
a simple prima facie showing by the defendant. 
Under the evidentiary-hearing approach, a defendant 
would have the initial burden to establish his or her right to 
such a hearing. This would require the defendant to reasonably 
call into doubt whether the primary purpose of the wiretap 
application was to investigate a Title III predicate offense—i.e., 
a defendant must present specific, articulable reasons to 
believe that the government is using Title III as a subterfuge to 
investigate a non-predicate criminal offense. This initial 
 
311. See United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1990); 
see also Derik T. Fettig, When "Good Faith" Makes Good Sense: Applying 
Leon's Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to the Government's Reasonable 
Reliance on Title III Wiretap Orders, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 373, 408-09 (2012) 
(discussing the “good faith” exception). 
312. See supra Part IV.A. 
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burden is justified in order to protect the government from 
unwarranted fishing expeditions by defendants seeking to 
explore the government’s investigation for reasons 
unassociated with challenging the wiretap warrant. Due to the 
difficulty involved with presenting objective proof that the 
government acted in bad faith, a relatively low standard would 
be appropriate. 
Any number of different standards could be adopted in this 
regard. One reasonable standard justifying an evidentiary 
hearing is as follows: first, the defendant would have to (1) 
show that the government knew that it would likely uncover 
evidence of a non-Title III offense, and (2) demonstrate some 
articulable reason to call into question whether the 
government’s primary intent in using wiretaps was to 
investigate a Title III offense. This standard appropriately 
focuses on what the government knew at the time of its 
warrant application and on whether the government intended 
to leverage this knowledge by abusing Title III. 
This standard for establishing a right to an evidentiary 
hearing has several advantages. To begin, this approach 
maintains the “incidental” standard adopted by the 
Rajaratnam court and many others.313 It rejects, as many 
courts have already done, the notion that an interception must 
be “inadvertent” by requiring a showing greater than that 
which establishes that the interception of “plain view” evidence 
was an anticipated consequence.314 In rejecting the 
“inadvertent” standard, the district court in Rajaratnam stated 
that such a standard would “bar the government from using 
wiretaps for wire fraud investigations whenever the fraud 
concerns securities.”315 Under this suggested standard, 
however, such a fear should be alleviated. 
At the same time, this standard rejects the unjustified 
result that the more blatant the government is in disclosing 
that it intends to uncover evidence of other non-predicate 
 
313. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143175, *11-19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (collecting cases), aff’d, 
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013); see also supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
314. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 
1983). 
315. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19. 
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crimes the more successful it will be in using this evidence at 
trial. The government would therefore be presented with a 
choice; it could choose to disclose its knowledge that it will 
likely intercept “plain view” evidence of other crimes (in the 
warrant application itself), in which case a defendant can 
establish the first prong necessary to obtain an evidentiary 
hearing. Alternatively, the government could hide this fact. 
Ethical concerns aside, the government would be discouraged 
from concealing this knowledge for two additional reasons. 
First, there are added protections within the statute likely to 
expose this deception. For example, Title III requires that 
when a wiretap warrant is extended beyond thirty days, the 
government must provide “a statement setting forth the results 
thus far obtained from the interception.”316 If the government 
charges the defendant with a non-Title III offense, but intends 
to use evidence not disclosed in subsequent applications, the 
government’s concealment becomes obvious. Second, this type 
of deception, if it is discovered, is in and of itself strong 
evidence of the bad faith likely to obviate the need for an 
evidentiary hearing.317 
This standard for securing an evidentiary hearing also has 
the advantage of placing primary importance on the 
government’s intent. After establishing that the government is 
aware that it will likely intercept evidence of a non-predicate 
crime, the standard for challenging the government’s primary 
purpose of the wiretap investigation should be relatively low. 
But as in other similar contexts, conclusory allegations should 
be rejected, and a defendant should have to point to specific, 
articulable reasons for doubting the government’s primary 
purpose. The Rajaratnam court acknowledged that charging a 
defendant with a Title III predicate offense may be evidence of 
good faith, but it refused to accept the contention that not 
charging a defendant with a predicate offense is evidence of 
 
316. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f) (2012). 
317. See, e.g., United States v. Goffer, No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL 
3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (“This representation [that evidence of 
other, non-predicate-offense crimes would likely be uncovered in using a 
wiretap] ensured that the wiretaps were not obtained as a ‘subterfuge’ or to 
surreptitiously investigate crimes other than those about which they 
informed the court.”). 
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bad faith.318 Under the standard discussed above, however, 
failing to charge a defendant would be sufficient evidence to 
justify an evidentiary hearing. This is important because not 
charging a defendant with a Title III offense is often the only 
objective evidence a defendant will have to question the 
government’s true intent. That is not to say, however, that 
other specific, articulable reasons could not be presented. Of 
course, courts should not be in the position of encouraging 
prosecutors to over-charge a defendant for acts that the 
prosecutor, within his or her discretion, truly believes should 
not be charged as certain offenses. At the same time, however, 
permitting an evidentiary hearing under these circumstances 
would appropriately place the government in the position to 
justify its use of “plain view” evidence. As Judge Holwell 
recognized, “[t]he government’s charging decisions depend on a 
variety of factors.”319 But, if the government is truly acting in 
good faith, government agents should easily be able to 
articulate its reasons for charging a defendant with a non-Title 
III predicate offense, while at the same time not charging the 
defendant with the underlying offense justifying the use of a 
wiretap. 
Under this approach, if after an evidentiary hearing the 
court believes by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
government was primarily interested in investigating a non-
Title III offense, such as securities fraud, then evidence derived 
from the wiretap warrant should be suppressed. In such a 
situation, the third prong of § 2518(10)(a) would apply, which 
permits suppression where “the interception was not made in 
conformity with the order of authorization or approval.”320 A 
wiretap warrant implicitly authorizes the incidental intercept 
of “plain view” evidence. If a wiretap intercept of “plain view” 
evidence is not done “incidentally,” however, it does not 
comport with the judicial authorization. In addition, 
suppression may also be required under the first prong of § 
2518(10)(a).321 As discussed above, this section authorizes 
 
318. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *13 n.5. 
319. Id. 
320. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(iii). 
321. Id. at § 2518(10)(a)(i) 
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suppression where there has been a failure to comply with a 
substantive statutory provision meant to limit the use of 
wiretaps.322 Arguably, if the primary purpose of using a 
wiretap is to investigate a non-predicate offense, the predicate 
offense requirement itself is not adequately complied with. 
An alternative to the evidentiary-hearing approach would 
be to adopt a burden-shifting analysis. In many ways, this 
approach would be similar to the evidentiary-hearing approach. 
Pursuant to this standard, a defendant would first have the 
obligation to make a prima facie case that the government was 
acting in bad faith. Therefore, the defendant would have to 
present evidence that (1) the government knew it was likely to 
intercept “plain view” evidence of additional crimes, and (2) 
this was the government’s primary purpose in using a wiretap. 
A standard similar to that which would warrant an evidentiary 
hearing under that alternative approach would also be 
appropriate here. If a defendant succeeds in presenting a prima 
facie case that calls into question whether the government 
acted in good faith through the two criteria above, the burden 
would then shift to the government to come forward with 
evidence that it was primarily, or at least equally, interested in 
investigating the crime justifying the use of a wiretap. If the 
government cannot make such a showing, the wiretap evidence 
should be suppressed. If the government satisfies this burden, 
then the burden would again shift back to the defendant to 
prove that the government’s justification is pretextual. The 
level of proof necessary to establish that the government’s 
explanation was pretextual would be greater than that 
required to establish a prima facie case. 
Both the evidentiary-hearing and burden-shifting 
approaches have the advantage of placing the greatest burden 
on the government (after a small initial burden is overcome by 
the defendant). The statute itself envisions that the 
government would have the burden of establishing the 
application of the plain-view exception of § 2517(5).323 Most 
obviously, Title III permits the use of this evidence only where 
it is “authorized or approved by a judge of competent 
 
322. See supra Part IV.B. 
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
  
1206 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application 
that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter.”324 By requiring the 
government to make this application, Title III implicitly places 
the burden on the government to prove the applicability of this 
exception. Legislative history supports this interpretation: “[a] 
subsequent application would include a showing that” this 
exception was properly used.325 
From a doctrinal standpoint, the evidentiary-hearing and 
the burden-shifting approaches would be very similar. In 
practice, there are benefits and drawbacks to either approach. 
For example, an evidentiary-hearing approach permits more 
accurate fact-finding because a defendant is directly allowed to 
obtain evidence through cross-examination. In contrast, the 
burden-shifting approach offers the defendant less opportunity 
to question government witnesses or obtain documents. Of 
course, these approaches are simply suggestions, and courts 
can ultimately combine these approaches or find other 
adequate ways to guard against the abuse of Title III. 
All of this being said, one could argue that securities-fraud 
and other types of white-collar criminal schemes are exactly 
the type of crimes that Congress envisioned would be 
investigated using covert electronic surveillance. In passing 
Title III, Congress found that “[o]rganized criminals make 
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their 
criminal activity” and that “[t]he interception of such 
communications . . . is an indispensable aid to law enforcement 
and the administration of justice.”326 Those engaging in an 
insider-trading scheme, where one party passes information to 
another so that they may unlawfully trade on this inside 
knowledge, are certainly “organized criminals,” although 
perhaps not in the traditional sense of being associated with 
mafia activity. Indeed, since the late 1960s, Congress has 
continuously added to the list of predicate offenses, indicating 
 
324. See id. 
325. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2189 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
326. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968). 
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an expansive trend.327 Ultimately, however, adding securities 
fraud to the list of predicate offenses is a job for Congress, and 
the restrictions placed on what types of crimes may be 
investigated using wiretaps must be enforced by the courts. It 
is not the province of our judicial system to weaken the 
protections for individual privacy enacted by Congress. 
In the end, there are numerous possible approaches courts 
could adopt to adequately protect against Title III becoming a 
subterfuge through which prosecutors and other government 
authorities investigate non-predicate offenses: courts could 
increase judicial supervision over wiretap intercepts on an 
ongoing basis, adopt one of several approaches permitting a 
criminal defendant to more easily challenge the government’s 
assertion of good faith, adopt a mix of these approaches, or 
develop other alternatives. The primary focus of these efforts, 
however, almost certainly must be on limiting the use of the 
plain-view exception of § 2517(5).328 By limiting the application 
of this exception, privacy interests will be better protected by 
discouraging government authorities from using wiretaps as a 
matter of course. 
 
B. A Return to the Giordano Standard and Strict Compliance  
 With the Necessity Requirement 
 
In addition to breathing new life into the limitations of the 
plain-view exception to the predicate offense requirement, 
courts must also adequately enforce the requirement that the 
government provide a “full and complete statement” of the facts 
indicating that a wiretap is necessary.329 As recent cases 
indicate, courts have essentially been ignoring controlling 
Supreme Court precedent dating back to the 1970s in 
determining whether the government has satisfied its burden 
 
327. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. VIII, IX, XI, §§ 810, 902(a), 
1103, 84 Stat. 924, 936, 940, 941, 947, 952, 959 (1970); Border Tunnel 
Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-127, § 4, 126 Stat. 370, 371 (2012); cf. 
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). 
328. See 18 U.S.C. 2517(5). 
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b). 
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of establishing the necessity of using a wiretap.330 By 
inappropriately applying a constitutional standard to an 
entirely statutorily-created requirement, courts have 
unjustifiably shifted the burden to criminal defendants to 
disprove necessity, which allows the government to abuse the 
wiretap application process. Rather than appropriately placing 
the burden of proof on the government to establish the 
necessity of a wiretap, applying a Franks analysis shifts the 
burden to a criminal defendant to prove (1) that the 
government did not provide a “full and complete statement” in 
knowing, intentional, or reckless disregard of its obligations 
and (2) that the falsity or omission at issue was material to the 
issuing judge’s determination of necessity.331 This threatens the 
delicate balance between privacy and law-enforcement 
interests that Congress initially sought to achieve.332 A return 
to a more demanding standard based upon the statutory text is 
required to once again achieve the appropriate balance. 
As the Supreme Court in Giordano counseled, suppression 
of a wiretap secured under Title III does not turn upon Fourth 
Amendment standards, but rather, suppression should always 
be determined on the basis of the statutory text.333 Moreover, in 
Chavez the Court noted that “strict adherence” to Title III’s 
requirements should be demanded.334 Although it is entirely 
appropriate to apply certain constitutional standards within 
the framework of Title III—e.g., the standard for probable 
cause—this is only because the statutory text itself and the 
legislative history of Title III provides for the application of 
these standards.335 Recently, however, courts have been 
applying the constitutional standard for the sufficiency of a 
warrant affidavit to the non-constitutionally based 
requirement of necessity.336 This threatens the balance 
 
330. See supra Part VI. 
331. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 
332. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
333. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (Suppression 
under Title III “does not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule 
aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the 
provisions of Title III.”). 
334. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 580 (1974). 
335. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. 
336. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also supra Part 
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Congress sought to achieve in passing Title III. As the Fourth 
Circuit warned in a slightly different context, “In the fast-
developing area of communications technology, courts should 
be cautious not to wield the amorphous [Fourth Amendment] 
standard in a manner that nullifies the balance between 
privacy rights and law enforcement needs struck by Congress 
in Title III.”337 
To avoid interfering with the balance Congress sought in 
passing Title III, courts should focus more on whether the 
government succeeded or failed in satisfying the statutory 
requirement of providing “a full and complete statement” to the 
issuing judge338 rather than focusing on whether the 
government would be able to establish the appropriateness of a 
warrant despite factual misrepresentations or omissions—a 
primary concern under a Fourth Amendment challenge. This is 
a somewhat subtle change, but a nevertheless important one. 
By slightly reframing the appropriate question to answer—
focusing more on whether the government satisfied its initial 
statutory burden of being both forthright and honest, rather 
than on what a theoretically corrected affidavit would have 
looked like—courts can adhere more closely to the purposes 
underpinning Title III and better protect individual privacy. 
It is important to note that, in addition to applying a 
Franks analysis to the issue of necessity, courts have also 
adopted a Franks analysis in the context of Title III’s probable 
cause requirements.339 This, however, is unsurprising, and it is 
likely a correct application of a constitutional doctrine within 
the context of Title III. After all, § 2518(10)(a)(i) permits 
suppression for violations of the Fourth Amendment,340 and the 
legislative history of Title III also indicates that § 2518(10)(a) 
was meant to “largely reflect[] existing law.”341 The necessity 
 
III.B.3. 
337. In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)). 
338. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012). 
339. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *23-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
340. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974). 
341. See id. at 529 n.17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182). 
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requirement, however, is not a requirement under the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore did not represent “existing law” at 
the time of its adoption. Thus, it makes little sense to take a 
statutory requirement and supplant it with a constitutional 
doctrine in this context. This is especially true when considered 
against the underlying purpose of the necessity requirement 
and Title III in general. 
In addressing the application of a Giordano analysis to the 
necessity requirement, the Second Circuit recently reasoned, 
relying on language from the legislative history of Title III, 
that because Title III “was not intended ‘generally to press the 
scope of the suppression role beyond [then current] search and 
seizure law,’” cases such as Franks and United States v. Leon 
that were decided after the passage of Title III could apply to 
the statute’s provisions.342 This analysis, however, completely 
ignores the primary lesson taught by Giordano—that 
suppression under Title III “does not turn on the judicially 
fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of 
Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the provisions of Title III . 
. . .”343 The Giordano court specifically addressed the language 
in the legislative history relied upon the Second Circuit. The 
Supreme Court noted that this language seemed to be in 
conflict with other language in the legislative history indicating 
that § 2518(10)(a) was intended “to guarantee that the 
standards of [Title III] will sharply curtail the unlawful 
interception of wire and oral communications.”344 Based on 
both of these legislative statements, the Court concluded that 
“it would not extend existing search-and-seizure law for 
Congress to provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in 
violation of explicit statutory prohibitions.”345 The Rajaratnam 
 
342. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2185). 
343. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524; see also Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 
250 F.3d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Congress made [Title III] the primary 
vehicle by which to address violations of privacy interests in the 
communications field. . . . All such constitutional questions are 
pretermitted.”). 
344. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528 (internal quotation and citations 
omitted). 
345. Id. 
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court ignored the Supreme Court’s reconciliation of the 
legislative history. Moreover, the Second Circuit’s analysis 
further ignored an important lesson from Chavez: that “strict 
adherence” to the statutory text should be mandated.346 
The Rajarantam court’s conclusory reasoning was also 
applied in an earlier Second Circuit case, United States v. 
Bianco,347 which the Rajaratnam court cited to approvingly.348 
In Bianco, the court again ignored the main precept of 
Giordano and further reasoned that “[i]f anything, Franks 
enhances the protection of the defendants, by applying to the 
wiretap statute an important constitutional principle that has 
been accepted by all courts.”349 Unexplained, however, is how 
this can possibly increase the protection of a defendant by 
applying this standard under Title III, when the defendant is 
protected by Franks regardless of the existence of Title III. 
Moreover, as noted by the Second Circuit in Rajaratnam, the 
Franks decision actually “narrowed the circumstances in which 
. . . [courts] apply the exclusionary rule,” it does not expand 
protections available to defendants.350 
One of the purposes of adopting Title III was to provide 
protections greater than those afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment. For example, Congress provided for, inter alia, 
heightened particularity requirements, a necessity 
requirement, minimization requirements, and requirements 
meant to hold public officials accountable for excessive wiretap 
use.351 The Supreme Court has specifically stated that the 
necessity requirement “is simply designed to assure that 
wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional 
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”352 
 
346. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 580 (1974). 
347. 998 F.2d 1112, 1126 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by 
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
348. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2013). 
349. Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126. 
350. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 152 (quoting Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126). 
351. See generally supra Part III. 
352. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S 143, 153 n.12 (1974) (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 
1978) (“Th[e] ‘necessity’ requirement exists to limit the use of wiretaps 
because of their highly intrusive nature and to ‘assure that wiretapping is not 
resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would 
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Because the necessity requirement is meant to restrict the use 
of wiretaps to appropriate cases, it is the very type of 
requirement that the Giordano Court deemed to have a 
“central role in the statutory scheme.”353 This is in contrast to 
the probable cause requirements of Title III, which the 
government would have to comply with regardless of whether 
Title III specifically mandated it. In other words, the probable 
cause requirement of Title III is not central to its legislative 
purpose because any government authority applying for a 
warrant—including a wiretap warrant—would have to supply 
evidence of probable cause regardless of the strictures of Title 
III.354 The probable cause requirements of Title III therefore do 
not protect against the excessive use of wiretaps beyond what 
the Federal Constitution itself prohibits. As such, the probable 
cause requirement does not play a “central role in the statutory 
scheme,” unlike the necessity requirement, which provides 
greater protection for individual privacy than the Constitution 
does. 
One prerequisite to a lawful wiretap is pre-application 
approval by a designated government official.355 The Giordano 
court, however, also implicitly concluded that knowledgeable 
approval by a judicial officer was a prerequisite for a lawful 
intercept.356 In considering whether an extension order 
permitting the electronic surveillance of additional suspects 
were appropriate, the Court stated that: 
 
It is urged in dissent that the information 
obtained [unlawfully] may be ignored and that 
the remaining evidence submitted in the 
extension application was sufficient to support 
the extension order. But whether or not the 
application, without the facts obtained from 
monitoring Giordano’s telephone, would 
 
suffice to expose the crime.” (quoting Kahn, 415 U.S. at 153 n.12)). 
353. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527-28. 
354. See supra Part III.B.2. 
355. See Giordano, at 512-23. 
356. See id. at 515-516 (“The mature judgment of a particular, 
responsible Department of Justice official is interposed as a critical 
precondition to any judicial order.”). 
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independently support original wiretap 
authority, the Act itself forbids extensions of prior 
authorizations without consideration of the 
results meanwhile obtained.357 
 
Here, the Court again placed importance on judicial pre-
screening. Failure to appropriately obtain judicial screening in 
and of itself would be a violation of a substantive provision 
central to the statutory scheme that would likely require 
suppression.358 Unlike a clerical error, such as misstating the 
authorizing official, as was the case in Chavez, failure to 
provide a “full and complete statement” of the facts 
 
357. Id. at 533 (emphasis added). 
358. See In re Application for Interception of Wire Commc’ns, 2 F. Supp. 
2d 177, 179 (D. Mass. 1998). In this case, a district court, after learning that 
federal authorities had not been completely forthcoming in other wiretap 
warrant applications in other cases added a handwritten requirement in the 
margin of an order approving the use of a wiretap, which stated: “This order 
is entered on the express representation that there are no other informants 
presently known to the government knowledgeable of the matters contained 
herein. If that representation is inaccurate, this order is of no force and 
effect.” Id. at 177. The Government sought to have the court reconsider this 
language, but the court rejected this attempt, reasoning that: 
 
The independent determination by a judicial officer—rather 
than by a law enforcement officer—of the necessity of 
electronic surveillance undergirds the very constitutionality 
of Title III. Indeed, it is this independent judicial 
assessment that ensures that electronic surveillance is 
consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court’s order makes it clear, without impugning the 
integrity of the individual agents making this application, 
that it will not tolerate the willful or reckless submission of 
misleading or incomplete information in support of an 
application to conduct electronic surveillance. The 
government will not have met its burden of justifying this 
intrusive technique, unless its agents have been candid with 
one another and with the Court. The Court’s order further 
puts the United States on notice that, should the Court 
come to learn of any deception in this regard, its order 
allowing such an application will have no force or effect. 
 
Id. at 179 (internal citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 
F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting an insufficient warrant application 
“will effectively deny the district judge his statutory role”). 
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establishing necessity does indeed “affect the fulfillment of . . . 
the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress.”359 
Moreover, nothing in Giordano or its progeny suggests that 
the court would have recognized an exception for satisfying the 
judicial approval requirement after the fact—i.e., the court 
required strict compliance with the substantive provisions.360 
For example, nothing in Giordano indicates that the Court 
would have reached the opposite conclusion had the Attorney 
General submitted an affirmation or an affidavit swearing 
under oath that he would have approved the wiretap 
application if it had been presented to him prior to filing. It 
would have made little sense to supply a judicially-crafted 
 
359. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974) (emphasis 
added). The Spagnuolo court noted: 
 
To delay the wiretap order while ordinary techniques are 
employed or to undertake to educate a district judge to 
enable him to appreciate their level of experience no doubt 
appears to such agents as a waste of time and resources. 
Their perception may be accurate, but Congress has 
deprived it of decisive influence. The particularized showing 
here described is necessary. The district judge, not the 
agents, must determine whether the command of Congress 
has been obeyed. 
 
 Spanguolo, 549 F.2d at 710-11. 
360. As Professor Robert Blakey, who was actively involved in the 
passage of Title III, argues in his amicus curiae brief in front of the Second 
Circuit in the Rajaratnam case: 
 
The prior judicial review that Congress found to be central 
to Title III and that was determined to be indispensable to 
protecting the rights enunciated in Berger and Katz is 
simply impossible when the government fails to provide a 
full and complete disclosure of necessity. Without that 
statement, an authorizing judge cannot appropriately 
determine whether a wiretap should issue. The 
government’s failure to meet the statutory test constituted a 
blatant violation of a provision of Title III that plays a 
central role in the statutory scheme. 
 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor G. Robert Blakey in Support of Appellant at 
21, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 11-4416-cr, 2013 WL 3155848, at *1 (2d 
Cir. June 24, 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 453986, at *21 (quoting 
Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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exception such as this. The primary purpose of the statute is to 
protect individual privacy against the excessive use of intrusive 
surveillance measures. The harm to individual privacy 
resulting from a wiretap occurs at the moment of interception; 
once a private conversation is intercepted, the harm to privacy 
interests has already come to fruition. Thus, permitting a post 
hoc justification should not be permitted because the harm 
sought to be avoided has already occurred.361 A Franks 
analysis, which in practical effect allows for justification of the 
necessity requirement after the interception has already 
occurred, therefore does little, if anything, to protect the 
relevant privacy interests. In order to give life to the purpose of 
the necessity requirement, a more demanding standard is 
necessary. 
To a certain degree, adopting a Franks analysis for the 
requirement of necessity makes sense within the structure of 
the statutory scheme. In addition to supplying a “full and 
complete statement” of facts establishing necessity, Title III 
also demands that a wiretap applicant provide a “full and 
complete statement” of the facts establishing probable cause.362 
On a textual basis, this would seem to indicate that the same 
standard should be applied when evaluating whether the 
government has satisfied its statutory application 
 
361. Cf. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317-
18 (1972). The court stated: 
 
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's 
surveillance of [defendant’s] conversations was a reasonable 
one which readily would have gained prior judicial approval. 
. . . The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial 
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be 
reasonably exercised. . . . The independent check upon 
executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government 
argues, by extremely limited post-surveillance judicial 
review. Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach 
the surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions. 
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the 
time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
362. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012) with id. § 2518(1)(b). 
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requirements. Undercutting this reading of the statute, 
however, is that the same “full and complete statement” 
standard applies to the warrant extension provisions of § 
2518(1)(e).363 The Supreme Court has already indicated that 
including facts obtained from previous electronic surveillance 
in an extension application is a substantive provision—i.e., it is 
central to the statutory purpose.364 Perhaps a stronger 
structural argument can be made for applying a Franks 
analysis to the necessity requirement by looking at § 2518(3).365 
This subsection provides that upon a wiretap application, a 
judge may issue an ex parte order only where the judge finds, 
based on the facts submitted, that: 
 
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit a particular offense enumerated 
in section 2516 of this chapter; 
(b) there is probable cause for belief that 
particular communications concerning that 
offense will be obtained through such 
interception; 
(c) normal investigative procedures have been 
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
(d) except [in the case of a “roving” wiretap], 
there is probable cause for belief that the 
facilities from which, or the place where, the 
wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be 
intercepted are being used, or are about to be 
used, in connection with the commission of such 
offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or 
commonly used by such person.366 
 
Here, the necessity requirement is on the same footing as the 
 
363. See id. § 2518(1)(e). 
364. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 533. 
365. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
366. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(d). 
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constitutional requirements of probable cause and 
particularity. However, as noted earlier, Title III actually has 
greater particularity requirements than under the Fourth 
Amendment.367 Both of these above interpretative arguments 
are also vitiated by the underlying purpose of each statutory 
requirement. As explained above, the probable cause 
requirement was meant to maintain the status quo, while the 
necessity requirement was meant to afford greater protection 
to privacy interest.368 
Courts have also been quick to note that “it is not [a 
court’s] province to engage in de novo review of a[] [warrant] 
application; instead, we test it in a practical and commonsense 
manner to determine whether the facts which it sets forth are 
minimally adequate to support the findings made by the 
issuing judge.”369 This is certainly correct; a determination of 
wiretap necessity is analogous to a factual finding that 
reviewing courts are apprehensive to second-guess. Therefore, 
a court should not lightly overturn an issuing judge’s 
determination that “necessity” is present in a given case. This 
does not mean, however, that a court should abstain from 
deciding whether or not an issuing judge’s decision was based 
on misleading or incomplete information. It also does not mean 
that a reviewing court should give similarly greater discretion 
where a judge’s determination is made on the basis of this 
misleading or incomplete data. As the Sixth Circuit succinctly 
put it: 
 
Generally, in reviewing the validity of an 
electronic surveillance order, we will accord great 
deference to the determinations of the issuing 
judge. However, this deference does not logically 
apply where the issuing judge is given 
misleading information in the wiretap 
 
367. See generally supra Part III. 
368. See supra notes 329-46 and accompanying text. 
369. See United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. 
Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Scibelli, 
549 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir. 1977) (collecting cases)), abrogation recognized by 
United States v. Al Jaber, 436 F. App’x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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application or supporting affidavits.370 
 
Taking all of this into consideration, courts should adopt a 
more stringent standard to appropriately protect against abuse 
of the wiretap application process. An appropriate standard 
would in some sense look similar to a Franks analysis, but it 
would stop short of requiring a showing that the omitted or 
misstated fact was material, which essentially shifts the 
burden to the defendant to disprove necessity. Once a 
defendant has presented specific, articulable reasons to cast 
doubt on the veracity of the facts used to establish necessity in 
the government’s application, a Franks-type evidentiary 
hearing should be granted. 
At this stage, the defendant challenging the wiretap 
application should have the burden to come forward with 
sufficient evidence to justify a hearing. Placing this initial, but 
relatively light, burden on the defendant to present some 
minimal level of proof of falsity prevents courts from going on 
endless, unfruitful excursions into government investigations. 
It therefore takes into account considerations of judicial 
efficiency. Based on policies underlying the Fourth 
Amendment, a wiretap warrant is generally presumed valid.371 
 
370. United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf. United States v. Canfield, 212 
F.3d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In this situation, the issuing judge’s probable 
cause determination is not due any deference because he did not have an 
opportunity to assess the affidavit without the inaccuracies.”). 
371. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also United 
States v. Zapata, Nos. 96-1457, 97-1013, 96-1536, 96-1573, 1998 WL 681311, 
at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1998) (“Wiretap orders are presumed valid . . . .”). Cf. 
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972). 
There, the court stated: 
 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be 
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be 
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive 
Branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the 
executive officers of Government as neutral and 
disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are 
to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. But 
those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty 
should not be the sole judges of when to utilize 
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. 
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An even stronger case for assumed validity of a warrant can be 
made as it specifically relates to a wiretap warrant because of 
the added layers of protection provided by Title III. By the time 
a wiretap application is submitted for judicial approval, the 
Attorney General or one of his or her designated officials has 
already pre-approved the application, and therefore the 
government has already made an internal institutional 
determination that a wiretap is necessary. This pre-approval is 
not required by the Fourth Amendment. This added layer of 
protection gives further reason not to question the 
government’s good faith absent at least some minimal evidence 
to the contrary. For these reasons, a standard similar to that 
required to obtain an evidentiary hearing under Franks is also 
appropriate to use where a defendant challenges whether the 
government has supplied a “full and complete statement” 
concerning the requirement of necessity. This standard is the 
following: 
 
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the 
challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory 
and must be supported by more than a mere 
desire to cross-examine. There must be 
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless 
disregard for the truth, and those allegations 
must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They 
should point out specifically the portion of the 
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and 
they should be accompanied by a statement of 
supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or 
otherwise reliable statements of witnesses 
should be furnished, or their absence 
satisfactorily explained.372 
 
The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment 
accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield 
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence 
and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected 
speech. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
372. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 172. 
74http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7
  
1220 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
 
The burden at this hearing would then shift to the government 
to prove by a preponderance that they had acted appropriately 
and supplied a “full and complete statement” of necessity based 
on all of the facts developed at that hearing.373 If after the 
conclusion of the hearing the government has not met its 
burden and the court determines that the government 
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally omitted or 
misrepresented pertinent facts in its affidavit, all evidence 
derived from the subsequently issued wiretap should be 
suppressed. Unlike the analysis under Franks, the inquiry 
should end there; whether the omitted or misrepresented 
information is “material” should not be considered. This 
approach would place increased emphasis on appropriately 
obtaining judicial approval, and it would keep the burden of 
proof entirely on the government to prove that it complied with 
the statutory procedures. Both of these results are more in line 
with the statutory text and legislative history than is the 
current status quo. 
This approach would be similar (with one important 
difference) to what the appellant sought in United States v. 
Heilman,374 and which the Third Circuit declined to adopt.375 
There, the defendant argued that a Franks analysis is 
inapplicable to a wiretap challenge to the necessity 
requirement, and that instead of a Franks hearing, he should 
be entitled to a “necessity hearing.”376 Although not fully 
defining what such a hearing would entail, the defendant 
suggested that it would “include[] an inquiry into any material 
misstatements or omissions regarding necessity as part of the 
reviewing court’s duty to assess necessity.”377 The defendant in 
Heilman argued that he should be entitled to a “necessity 
hearing” simply by alleging that the government illegally 
 
373. Even under a Franks analysis, additional information not contained 
in the warrant affidavit may be used to determine the government’s state of 
mind. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 612 F.3d 998, 1003 n.7 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
374. 377 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2010). 
375. See id. at 183-84. 
376. See id. 
377. Id. 
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searched him.378 As the Third Circuit correctly noted, however, 
such a hearing should not be granted in the absence of at least 
some initial showing of falsity.379 
 
378. Id. at 184. The court articulated that: 
 
Pursuant to § 3504, if defendants claim that evidence 
against them was acquired as a result of prior, unlawful 
surveillance, the Government must confirm or deny whether 
that unlawful surveillance occurred. Napoli interprets the 
Government’s statutory obligation to confirm or deny the 
existence of the unlawful surveillance as to mandate a 
necessity hearing. This interpretation, however, is 
completely divorced from a plain reading of the text. 
Nothing in the text indicates that defendants are entitled to 
a hearing if they allege that the Government illegally 
searched them by electronic means. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
379. See id. While the Third Circuit refused to decide whether Franks is 
appropriate to apply to the necessity requirement, two cases from the Second 
Circuit have rejected a similar argument. In United States v. Bianco, the 
Second Circuit held that a Franks analysis is appropriate to apply to the 
“impracticality” provision for obtaining a “roving” wiretap under Title III, 
which similarly requires a “full and complete statement” on the question of 
“‘why such specification [of the place where the communication is to be 
intercepted] is not practical.’” United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1125 
(2d Cir. 1993), abrogation recognized by United States v. Galpin, No. 11-4808-
cr, 2013 WL 3185299, at *7 (2d Cir. June 25, 2013). The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that it “should look directly to the exclusionary rule of 
the statute, rather than to focus on fourth-amendment considerations or a 
Franks analysis.” Id. at 1125. In doing so, the court reasoned that the 
suppression provision was “not intended ‘generally to press the scope of the 
suppression role beyond [then] present search and seizure law,’” id. at 1126 
(citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185; 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)), and because Title III 
predated Franks, applying such an analysis would actually strengthen the 
protections of Title III. See Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126. This analysis, however, 
completely ignored Giordano and the legislative history indicating that the 
necessity requirement was intended to provide greater protections than that 
which is provided by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Giordano, 
416 U.S. 505, 526 (1974) (“[P]redecessor bills [to Title III] specified a fourth 
ground for suppression—the lack of probable cause—which was omitted in 
subsequent bills, apparently on the ground that it was not needed because 
official interceptions without probable cause would be unlawful within the 
meaning of [§ 2518(10)(a)(i)].”); see also United States v. Amanuel, 615 F.3d 
117, 125-27 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that Title III suppression is more 
expansive than the exclusionary rule). The Rajaratnam court also rejected 
these arguments, but did so by relying on Bianco, concluding that defendants’ 
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In addition to being more closely aligned with the statutory 
text, the “necessity hearing” approach better protects the 
privacy interests at stake. As noted above, individual privacy is 
harmed at the moment a private conversation is intercepted by 
a third party, such as an investigating government official.380 
Although this harm may be aggravated by repeating the 
contents of that conversation at a later time—e.g., by playing a 
recording of the intercepted conversation in open court—a 
private conversation no longer remains private from the 
moment another person eavesdrops or otherwise interferes. 
This truth is reflected in many areas of the law. In the Fourth 
Amendment context, holding a conversation with a known 
third-party present will destroy one’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.381 Similarly, the attorney-client privilege is destroyed 
where a third party is exposed to the contents of an attorney’s 
legal advice given to his or her client.382 Privacy interests can 
be protected effectively only where preventative measures are 
in place; it is exceedingly difficult to protect privacy 
retroactively. Congress established a number of preventative 
measures when it enacted Title III, and the necessity 
requirement is one of them. Therefore, it should be vigorously 
enforced. 
In this regard it is important to remember exactly the 
privacy interests at stake. It is feasibly possible to retroactively 
protect the privacy rights of each individual criminal defendant 
to a limited extent. This is the very premise underlying the 
exclusionary rule; an unconstitutional invasion into a private, 
protected area results in suppression. A Franks analysis also 
accomplishes this goal by suppressing evidence where, had the 
 
arguments were “foreclosd by settled precedent.” United States v. 
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112). 
380. See supra notes 88-89, 150 and accompanying text; see also supra 
Part III.B.4. 
381. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927))). 
382. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
2311, at 601-03 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (attorney-client 
communications in presence of third party not the agent of the attorney are 
not protected by the privilege). 
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government been fully truthful in its application, necessity of a 
wiretap would not have been established. But, retroactive 
protection of privacy rights has limitations. To begin, the 
remedy of suppression cannot undo an already-completed 
invasion of a person’s privacy. Instead, it merely serves as the 
next best alternative—protecting against further aggravation 
of the initial unlawful intrusion. Similarly, the suppression 
remedy has a limited reach in terms of who it protects. Only a 
criminal defendant successfully challenging the use of certain 
evidence directly benefits from the exclusion of that evidence. 
Others, however, indirectly benefit from suppression based on 
its deterrent effect on law enforcement. 
Title III is concerned with privacy interests much broader 
than those represented by persons who find themselves subject 
to criminal prosecution. Less than one-quarter of all authorized 
wire intercepts in 2011 resulted in the discovery of 
incriminating evidence.383 The vast majority of these intercepts 
therefore involved innocent, non-criminal communications. 
Many of these same intercepts also likely listened in on, not 
just innocent conversations by suspected criminals, but also 
conversations between a suspected criminal and wholly-
innocent individuals. An illustrative case is United States v. 
Goffer,384 another recent insider trading prosecution, where 
investigators using a wiretap listened in on private marital 
conversations between the defendant and his wife.385 Over the 
course of a sixty day period, federal agents intercepted 180 
calls between the defendant and his wife dealing “almost 
exclusively with personal and family matters,” none of which 
were incriminating.386 The court called the actions of federal 
investigators “disgraceful” and an “unnecessary, and 
apparently voyeuristic, intrusion into the [defendant and his 
wife’s] private life.”387 The invasion of privacy at stake where 
 
383. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.4. On average, 
868 out of 3,716 intercepts were incriminating, which equates to an 
incriminating-interception rate of 23.36%. 
384. 756 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-3951-cr(L), 2013 
WL 3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013). 
385. Id. at 591. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. at 594-595. 
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the government uses wiretaps is in contrast to a more typical 
Fourth Amendment violation of a person’s privacy, the 
collateral consequences of which are relatively limited. For 
example, a warrantless home invasion by police affects the 
privacy rights of the handful of other people who may live at 
the residence. A wiretap investigation spanning 30 days, on the 
other hand, has the capacity to ensnare possibly dozens of 
innocent people making contact with the target of the 
wiretap.388 This broad threat to privacy was the very reason 
Congress sought to limit the use of wiretaps beyond the 
protections afforded by the Constitution. Because of the 
broader scope of privacy interests at stake, the indirect benefit 
of police deterrence afforded by the remedy of suppression is of 
paramount importance when it comes to the covert interception 
of private conversations. Thus, requiring a less demanding 
standard on the defendant to suppress wiretap evidence is also 
appropriate as a matter of sound policy. 
At the same time, to balance appropriately privacy and 
law-enforcement concerns, courts should avoid applying a 
negligence standard to the government’s failure to provide a 
“full and complete statement” of the facts indicating necessity. 
Adopting a negligence standard to omissions or 
misrepresentations would not further the interests of 
individual privacy and would therefore be an unjustified boon 
to criminal defendants. Assuming that the government 
negligently omitted certain facts concerning necessity from a 
wiretap application, other protections exist for individual 
privacy. Most importantly, pre-application approval is required 
by the Attorney General or another appropriately designated 
official.389 This government official must conclude prior to 
submitting a warrant application that using a wiretap is 
necessary.390 Therefore, negligently or carelessly omitting or 
misrepresenting certain facts in a wiretap application is more 
 
388. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. 
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 389959, 
at *9 (stating the warrant and renewal applications in this case spanned nine 
months and “record[ed] over 2,200 private conversations between Appellant 
and at least 130 of his colleagues, employees, friends, and family”). 
389. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974). 
390. Id. at 527-28. 
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analogous to Chavez, where the Supreme Court held that 
improperly identifying the government official who pre-
approved the application does not require suppression.391 
Another important consideration is that the line between 
recklessness and negligence in regard to a wiretap affidavit 
will often be determined by the caliber of the omitted or 
misrepresented facts in the larger context of the investigation. 
The Rajaratnam case again provides a poignant example. 
There, the government failed to reveal that its investigation of 
one of the defendants dated back to the late 1990s, which to the 
district court was a “glaring” omission.392 Do to the sheer 
magnitude of the omission at issue, the district court concluded 
that the government had acted recklessly.393 On appeal, 
however, the Second Circuit was less convinced as to the 
magnitude of this omission, concluding that the government 
had acted, at most, negligently.394 The Second Circuit noted 
that “reckless disregard” can at times “be inferred from the 
omission of critical information in a wiretap application” 
because “[s]ubjective intent, after all, is often demonstrated 
with objective evidence.”395 This does not mean, however, that 
this inference “can be automatically drawn simply because a 
reasonable person would have included the omitted 
information, and the inference is particularly inappropriate 
where the government comes forward with evidence indicating 
that the omission resulted from nothing more than negligence, 
or that the omission was the result of a considered and 
reasonable judgment that the information was not necessary to 
the wiretap application.”396 Thus, the size and scope of the 
 
391. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 565 (1974); see also 
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 436 n.23 (1977). 
392. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, *36, 58 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 
139 (2d Cir. 2013). 
393. This consideration is distinct from the second prong of a Franks 
analysis concerning materiality. 
394. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
395. Id. at 154 (internal citations omitted). 
396. Id.; see also United States v. Rice, 478 U.S. 704, 715-18 (2007) (Bell, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Government’s omissions were merely 
negligent, not reckless). 
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omission are often critical considerations. Although the 
government should not have to give minutely detailed 
information about its investigation to obtain a wiretap 
warrant, it generally must give a broad and comprehensive 
overview—i.e., “a full and complete statement”—of the 
investigation. Applying a negligence standard would permit a 
defendant to attack a wiretap affidavit based upon omissions 
not particularly relevant to a full, inclusive determination of 
necessity. This would contradict the congressional intent that a 
necessity determination be made in a common sense manner.397 
Therefore, a negligence standard would require specificity in a 
wiretap warrant not intended by Congress. 
Of course, many of these same considerations are also to 
some extent inherent in the materiality determination of a 
Franks analysis. Determining the line between negligence and 
recklessness, however, is analytically distinct from a 
materiality determination. Importantly, the focus on the 
recklessness/negligence paradigm is placed on how the 
government acted and what its state of mind was. These 
considerations are the appropriate focus of a Title III 
suppression analysis, as they place a heavier burden on the 
government to act “by the book” of Title III. In contrast, the 
focus of the materiality determination under the Fourth 
Amendment and Franks is whether the certain intentional, 
knowing, or reckless actions of the government officials were 
important in the larger context of determining the 
appropriateness of issuing a warrant.398 
In sum, where a defendant argues that the government 
failed to satisfy the necessity requirement of Title III by failing 
to provide a “full and complete statement” of relevant facts, 
courts should refocus their analysis on what was provided in 
the wiretap affidavit itself and how the government acted. 
Where the defendant can present specific and articulable 
reasons to doubt the truthfulness or completeness of the 
wiretap application, an evidentiary hearing should be granted. 
 
397. See S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2190. 
398. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *70 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
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The burden at this stage should be on the government to prove 
that they obtained appropriate judicial pre-screening. After the 
conclusion of this evidentiary hearing, if the government 
cannot establish that it was thorough and honest in its wiretap 
affidavit (or merely negligent) regarding the facts of its 
investigation that are related to the issue of necessity, a court 
should order suppression. Unlike the current standard adopted 
by numerous Circuit Courts of Appeal,399 the second prong of a 
Franks analysis should be disregarded. Recklessly, knowingly, 
or intentionally failing to provide a “full and complete 
statement” of the facts concerning necessity is enough on its 
own to warrant suppression. By acting knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly the government cannot establish 
that a judge was presented with a “full and complete 
statement” of facts, and therefore the government cannot 
establish that Title III’s mandatory judicial screening 
requirement was complied with. This standard is more in line 
with congressional intent and governing Supreme Court 
precedent. Equally as important, this standard better protects 
individual privacy and properly rebalances this concern with 
law-enforcement interests. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
As a number of recent white-collar criminal prosecutions 
indicate, the privacy interests that Congress sought to protect 
by adopting a comprehensive scheme for obtaining a wiretap 
warrant are becoming increasingly at risk. By weakening the 
standard needed to obtain a wiretap and to subsequently use 
this evidence during a later prosecution, courts have 
encouraged the increased use of wiretaps. This is in stark 
contrast to the role Congress originally intended the courts to 
play in restricting the use of wiretaps to appropriate cases. A 
return to a more serious enforcement regime for Title III’s 
restrictive, substantive provisions will more adequately protect 
the privacy of innocent individuals. 
Recent trends show that prosecutors are poised to use 
wiretaps in the investigation of nearly any white-collar crime, 
 
399. See supra note 275-77 and accompanying text. 
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regardless of whether these crimes are generally subject to 
wiretap investigations under Title III. Similarly, a review of 
cases shows that courts have been ignoring the specifically 
provided suppression provisions of Title III in favor of a 
constitutionally-based approach when determining whether to 
suppress fruits of a wiretap warrant for failing the necessity 
requirement. Both of these trends encourage prosecutors to 
abuse the wiretap application process. Increased wiretap use in 
turn causes an increase in the number of innocent individuals 
who will have their conversations intercepted by government 
officials. These dangers have long been recognized. As Justice 
Brandeis declared in his Olmstead dissent, “writs of assistance 
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and 
oppression when compared with wire tapping.”400 
Two important changes are needed to rebalance the 
privacy interests Congress originally intended to protect in 
enacting the warrant application procedures of Title III. First, 
there must be stronger restrictions placed on the use of the 
plain-view exception to the predicate offense requirement. 
There are a number of ways to accomplish this. Courts could 
reassert their supervisory role over government investigators 
engaging in covert electronic surveillance in part by restricting 
the time the government has to submit a subsequent 
application to use “plain view” evidence at trial. Ultimately, 
however, this approach is unlikely to be successful. A more 
reasonable approach would be to develop a procedure for a 
criminal defendant to challenge the government’s assertion of 
good faith use of this exception. Permitting an evidentiary 
hearing once the defendant has made some minimal showing 
that challenges the government’s good faith or adopting a 
burden-shifting analysis are both appropriate means to 
accomplish this end. Next, courts should more strictly enforce 
the necessity requirement of Title III by placing increased 
importance on knowledgeable judicial pre-approval. The 
constitutional standard of Franks v. Delaware should be 
rejected in favor of a statutorily-based analysis more in line 
with United States v. Giordano and its progeny. The focus of 
 
400. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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this analysis should be on whether the government has 
satisfied its obligation to provide a “full and complete 
statement” of facts showing that a wiretap is necessary. With 
these changes courts can reverse the trend toward expanded 
wiretap use. 
In a modern world that is becoming increasingly reliant on 
social media, protecting the privacy of individuals is becoming 
a steeper uphill battle. Many have become complacent about 
privacy concerns due to their use—and their family and 
friends’ use—of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, 
YouTube, etc. Social media outlets such as these have 
increasingly opened up people’s lives to others. Although there 
are undoubtedly benefits to this increased connectivity, some 
are slowly starting to become aware of the dangers associated 
with it as well. For example, several states have recently 
passed legislation prohibiting prospective employers from 
asking interviewees for their Facebook passwords.401 As 
technology advances, however, we should not lose sight of older 
methods of communication, such as the telephone, and the 
risks posed to individual privacy when the government 
surreptitiously intercepts these communications. 
A job candidate is undoubtedly more sympathetic than an 
accused criminal defendant. Many would argue that there 
should be no privacy rights for those engaging in a criminal 
enterprise. Whether or not this is true, the privacy interests at 
stake extend far beyond the rights of those subject to criminal 
prosecution. Wiretaps have the ability to intercept 
conversations from dozens of innocent individuals. It is 
therefore important not to lose the forest for the trees. The 
unsympathetic nature of fallen Wall Street insiders should not 
interfere with a dogged adherence to the pursuit of protecting 
 
401. See Ed Yohnka, Another State Acts to Protect Facebook Passwords 
from Employers, ACLU.ORG, (Aug. 3, 2012, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/another-state-acts-protect-
facebook-passwords-employers; Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Enrages Your 
Boss, Social Net Speech is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, January 22, 2013, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-social-
media-policies-come-under-regulatory-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(“On Jan. 1, California and Illinois became the fifth and sixth states to bar 
companies from asking employees or job applicants for their social network 
passwords.”). 
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individual privacy more broadly. As Chief Justice Warren 
succinctly observed fifty years ago: “[T]he fantastic advances in 
the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger 
to the privacy of the individual.”402 Perhaps this is true now 
more than ever. 
 
 
402. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
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